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Intervention in Libya: 
A case of Political Realism? 
 
Joseph Kanaan 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis describes the new approach to the Arab Uprising through the case of Libya 
and the international intervention that had taken place.  It entertains competing 
propositions and implements a rational choice analysis approach to analyze decisions of 
key actors, namely France and the US in their rapprochement towards military 
interventionism. It examines the idealist v/s realist theses regarding the nature of 
interventionism in Libya through the lens of Carnegie’s commission on preventing 
Deadly Conflict.  Evidence points to a growing interventionism prescribed by United 
Nations’ Responsibility to Protect (R2P) that breaches state sovereignty while serving 
the interests of major powers through humanitarian pretexts. The thesis draws the 
conclusion that although the intervention in Libya is of a humanitarian face, critical 
power motives can be revealed through the lens of Realpolitik. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
The year 2011 was a year in which the Arab World revolted, where 
demonstrations and protests took place in more than one Arab country, these protests 
forever changed the political landscapes of the region.  The succession of protests that 
took place across the Arab world has become known as the “Arab Spring” or “Arab 
Uprisings”.  The demonstrations started to call for a more democratic and just system 
where demonstrators filled the streets in an attempt to force those in power to step down 
and let the people start ruling thus giving way to the will of the people. It all began on 
December 17, 2010, 26 year old when Mohammad Bou Azizi set himself on fire in 
front of a government building in Tunisia. His act of desperation resonated with many 
fellow Tunisians and protests started appearing around the country forcing the 23 year 
rule of Ben Ali to come to an end and the holding of free elections to take place. The 
downfall of Ben Ali happened within a month of Mohammad Bou Azizi setting himself 
on fire. To date, the uprisings have caused the stepping down of rulers from Tunisia, 
Egypt, Yemen and Libya.  Although most of the countries were filled with protests that 
tried to show civil resistance through campaigns, rallies, strikes and demonstration 
while using social media as a tool; however each country had its own conditions and 
factors that intermingled and played a role and which swung the revolution in its own 
path. Going forward one needs to understand how and why it happened. According to 
Lisa Anderson (2011) “in Tunisia, protesters escalated calls for the restoration of the 
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country’s suspended constitution. Meanwhile, Egyptians rose in revolt as strikes across 
the country brought daily life to a halt and toppled the government. In Libya, provincial 
leaders worked feverishly to strengthen their newly independent republic.”  Therefore 
the patterns and the ways of the protest were different. The demonstration in Tunisia, 
the first of the countries to begin a movement, started in the countryside areas and 
spiraled towards the capital, finding common cause with a once powerful but much 
repressed labor movement whereas in Libya the demonstrations started from the 
repressed tribes.  
1.1 Libya under the rule of Muammar Qaddafi 
 
Muammar Qaddafi seized power in Libya in a bloodless military coup on 
September 1, 1969, replacing the ruling Sansui Monarchy. Qaddafi assumed a key 
position in the Revolutionary Command Council, and his powers gradually changed 
from being a revolutionary leader to becoming an authoritarian autocrat. Qaddafi 
consolidated his power by capitalizing on the nation’s oil reserves, and propagandized 
his revolutionary and social philosophy through the dissemination of his Green Book 
which he published in 3 volumes (Liolos, 2012). In 1969, and upon taking power, 
Qaddafi established the “Jamahiriya” (“state of the masses”) and declared the Libyan 
regime as that.  The “Jamahiriya” is a personal creation of Qaddafi where Qaddafi 
based the regime that governed the country on himself only (Al- Qaddafi, M.). Studying 
Libya’s political regime can’t be feasible without passing through 42 years of Qaddafi’s 
leadership. Inspired by both the nationalist and socialist parties, Qaddafi published in 
1976 the major book for Libya in that arena. The “Green Book” was created by Qaddafi 
stating out his own way of ruling and thinking. He described it as: “his own odd, 
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utopian philosophy of governance, thus his political system meant the direct rule of the 
masses, an ultimate democracy, or a “collective of republics” comprising people’s 
congress at the local and national level and in which the entire economy would be 
nationalized.”  The “Jamahiriya” is governed by the “Green Book”, which is written in 
seven installments and published by Qaddafi as the rule of the nation. Although the 
formal institutions appear to be democratic and modern, it is usually not the case.  
Qaddafi’s ideas in making up his state and institutions are borrowed from great thinkers 
ranging from Plato to Mao as well as Prophet Mohammad and Nasser of Egypt. The 
institutions therefore include representatives that are elected, grass roots organizations, 
ministers, army, police, and bureaucracies where all formal political activity is to be 
conducted within a people’s Congress. The representatives of the formal institutions 
meet to develop and approve all politics.  In his “Green Book”, however, Qaddafi stated 
that: “representation is fraud and that no formal political representation is to be 
allowed”.  If within the “Jamahiriya” there is to be any attempt to establish political 
parties or to debate any points of view that are different to the point of view of the 
regime itself, it is to be considered as treason.   
According to Paoletti (2011), there are “four overlapping power structures 
account for Libya’s endemic statelessness: Qaddafi and his family members; Qaddafi’s 
inner circle; the tribal system; and the formal structure of the state of the masses”. 
(p.315)  This in itself tells us a lot about Qaddafi’s stated of the masses philosophy and 
the contradictions within.  
Anderson (2006) believes that the publication of his philosophy allowed Qaddafi 
to, begin to implement its Utopian provisions, outlawing rental property, wage labor 
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and retail trade, and ensuring a house, car and other essentials for all Libyan families; 
“the combination of high oil prices and the Green Book's pre capitalist economics 
conspired to produce a unique political, economic and social system dubbed the 
Jamahiriyya, or "state of the masses," by its author” (p. 42). With his control solidified, 
Qaddafi ruled Libya continuously from 1969 until his overthrow and death in 2011.  
The CIA fact book estimates the population of Libya to be around 5.6 million 
(July 2012 estimate) with a majority of Berber and Arab population forming around 
97% and 3% other ethnic groups. Tribalism is still a huge part of the Libyan make 
where there are around 140 tribal networks in the country. Although Libya has an 
abundance of oil revenues, much of the Libyan population is poor. Corruption is 
rampant and people are brutally suppressed.  According to Anderson (2011), “Libyans’ 
trust in their government and in one another eroded and they took refuge in the solace of 
tribe and family.  Libyan society had been fractured and every national institution, 
including the military, is divided by cleavages of kinship and region” (p. 6).  
Looking at Libya from an international perspective, it can be said that since the 
start of the Qaddafi regime, the relationship between Libya and the West has undergone 
many changes and have varied widely. Towards the end of the Kingdom of Libya, 
according to Maessen (2012), the United States had close relations with the country :“ 
the Wheelus Air Force base, located in Libya, was a vital link in the US’ military 
strategy for the region , furthermore US oil companies, such as ESSO, made 
considerable profits through the exploitation of Libyan oil” (Maessen 2012, p. 15) . 
After the 1969 coup d’état, the relationship with the West steadily declined. There are 
many reasons that can be accounted for to explain the decline of the relationship 
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between Libya and the West, the most prominent of which is Qaddafi’s nationalization 
of the country’s resources in 1970s as well as his support for international terrorism, the 
increasing political and military alignment with the Soviet Union and his support of the 
Palestinians in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. According to Kinsman (2011), “any 
internationally disruptive cause won Qaddafi’s favor – and finance and weapons from 
his oil wealth”… “he grew a kind of natural notoriety and the boost he gave to 
dictators”… “Supporting terrorism came naturally – Black September, the Red Army 
Faction and the IRA” (p. 83). When in 1979, the Libyan authorities did not protect the 
US embassy from being attacked by students during the Iranian hostage crisis, president 
Reagan believed that the Libyan regime had taken sides with Ayatollah Khomeini in 
Iran and therefore  started to systematically increase “diplomatic, economic, and 
military pressure on Libya” ( as cited in Maessen, 2012, p. 16). In 1983, the US tried to 
assassinate Qaddafi and upon failing to do so continued to bomb Libyan centers in 
Benghazi and Tripoli in 1986. This led to an increase in the deteriorating situation and 
resulted in having the Libyan regime retaliate on December 21, 1988, with the 
‘Lockerbie Bombing’ of Pan-Am flight 103 and with the exploding of a French UTA 
plane in 1989.  
As a response to the terrorist attacks on the planes, France, The United Kingdom 
and the United States demanded that the Libyan regime extradite the suspects but to no 
avail causing the United Nations Security Council to pass resolution 748 in March 
1992, imposing multidimensional sanctions on Libya further isolating Libya 
internationally.(UN SC Resolution 748, 1992).  In April 1999, almost a decade later, 
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Libya finally agreed to extradite the two suspects allowing them to be judged under 
Scottish law in The Hague.  
The Libyan decision to finally extradite the suspects of the Pan-Am Flight 103 
bombing, was seen by many members of the international community “as a major 
turning point in Libya's relations with the rest of the world” (as cited in Maessen 2012, 
p. 16).  In the years that followed, Qaddafi had a major change in his foreign policy 
particularly in his condemnation of the 9/11 attaches and showing sympathy to the 
victims. Qaddafi started to respond and work with the West in their “war on terror” and 
in 2003 and 2004 agreed to have Libya take responsibility for the bombings on the Pan-
Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772 to the extent that he agreed to pay the sum of $2.7 
billion and $170 million to compensate the victims’ families.  
Moreover according to Maessen (2012), in December 2003, Libya proclaimed 
that it had decided on its ‘own free will’ to abandon all unconventional weapons, 
including nuclear weapons eventually leading to the removal of American bilateral 
sanctions and the removal of Libya from the State Department’s list of states that 
sponsor terrorism. 
Therefore, by the time of the crisis in Libya, it seems as if Libya had regained its 
positive relationship with the West with political relations normalized and oil exports 
from Libya on the rise.  
1.2 The Factors that played a role in the Uprising in Libya 
 
As mentioned earlier, the tribes of Libya played a role in Qaddafi’s political 
system. It is worth taking time to see how the tribes themselves played a role in the 
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uprising especially in a country like Libya where demographic diversity doesn’t play a 
huge role and where religious segregation does not affect the political system of the 
country. Tribes and their identity do have a role. Libya is considered to be a large 
country were most of this society is homogenously compatible i.e. they are Sunni 
Muslim. Libya consists of other minorities such as “Berbers 5%, Africans 3% and 
Tuareg 1 %” (Najm. 2008). As pointed out before, Libya in itself is a weak state with a 
powerful leadership and therefore it is important to note that if Qaddafi were not in 
power, looking at the tribes would not have been as important. In order to stay in power, 
Qaddafi understood the important nature of the tribes and in controlling them. 
According to Khallen Collins (2004), a researcher in political studies, when trying to 
define the Libyan case “clans or tribes become increasingly important politically within 
weakening states.” An important characteristic of tribes is their loyalty and their main 
objective has more to do with the building of their own society and networking (Collins, 
2004). Therefore, Qaddafi tried to link his own tribe to the major tribes in the country 
and as mentioned before he allowed them to play a huge role in many sectors including 
economic, military and political.  
Furthermore, Qaddafi established “social people’s leadership” which is mainly 
based on the tribes and their networks. This was one of the major tactics that Qaddafi 
tried to play in order to control any movements. The tribes in Libya were empowered by 
the regime itself to solve their conflicts and help build their own society. In doing so, 
Qaddafi wanted to show that he was not an authoritarian ruler since  an authoritarian 
ruler would not  try to jump to any institutional approaches; however although his 
empowerment was to show democracy or the will of the people, it was in reality one of 
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the strategies he used to remain in power and control. Tribes were therefore, the major 
actors in the political system that Qaddafi used as a fence for his regime. 
Moreover Qaddafi’s appearance in his tents with his advisors (the men of the 
tent) and not in normal palaces as other regime leaders, gave him a point of attraction in 
the whole words. (Anderson, 1990.) The main power of government took place mainly 
in the presidential tents that are mainly composed of Qaddafi himself, his advisors, his 
trusted confidents, comprising member of the Qaddafi family and his tribe. This 
network mainly determined Libya’s fate, power and strategy on different levels, i.e. 
military, economy, and political.  
 “The revolutionary committees’ movements” is another of Qaddafi’s 
committees appointed to ensure his maintenance of power. Historically these 
committees were created in the 1970s after the revolution and their major role is to be a 
“safeguard” for the revolution. Their main objective is therefore to spread the regime 
ideology by mobilizing people and creating loyalists for the regime. Those committees 
are directly linked to Qaddafi giving him absolute authority and hindering the 
establishment of institutions.  
To meet their objectives and mission, the revolutionary committees established 
their own media and press room in their own regions and areas. Furthermore, these 
committees had another role to oppress all movements against the regime. They can 
arrest students, protestors, and any person whom they believe is disloyal to the regime. 
Even in some cases they have to power after consulting with Qaddafi to execute people 
whom are believed to be opponents to the regime. Basically these committees were 
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essential tools for Qaddafi’s regime and mainly they played a critical part in ensuring its 
continuation.   
1.2.1 Libyan oil and outside interference 
 
Qaddafi ensured that he kept his power intact by capitalizing on the nation’s oil 
reserves, and propagandized his revolutionary and social philosophy through the 
dissemination of his Green Book which he published in 3 volumes (Liolos, 2012). 
According to Anderson (2006) “the combination of high oil prices and the Green Book's 
pre capitalist economics conspired to produce a unique political, economic and social 
system dubbed the jamahiriyya, or "state of the masses," by its author” (p. 42). 
Although Libya has a large amount of oil revenues, much of the Libyan population is 
poor.  
Although Qaddafi used those oil revenues to finance some improvements in 
public services, further to some investment at the infrastructure level in order to 
promote some development and “outright repression in the name of revolutionary 
unity.” The Libyan citizens still believed and proclaimed that a huge part of the oil 
revenues was allocated to finance Qaddafi’s dream and “adventures” outside the 
“Jamahiriya” and have not any benefits to the society. Being part of the OPEC Libya 
played an instrumental role on the oil price. Thus, at the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1973 
Qaddafi used oil production as a weapon towards the western county. (Calhoun.2012).  
The conflict in Libya while being one in which the Libyan people are leading 
the uprising, had the backing of the international community where the UN Security 
Council issued resolution 1973 allowing a no-fly zone and military interference in the 
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conflict, less than a month after it started. Etzioni (2012) questioned the military 
interference which had its main argument according to the international community be 
as one that was strictly humanitarian and was don’t in order to prevent Qaddafi from his 
threat against the rebels. Yet this was not the only goal. According to Etizioni (2012) 
the goal of the Libyan mission expanded to include a change in regime which was seen 
as essential to achieve the humanitarian goal as well as to fulfill the imperial project in 
both North and West Africa. To understand this concept better we must therefore look 
at the strategic position that Libya plays in this project.  Libya occupies a strategic 
position since it is located on the North African coast that is very important to defend 
European borders from African immigration. Another factor to look at is an economic 
factor based on oil and energy demands which is an important dimension to address. 
Libya is the seventeenth largest world oil producer and the third largest in Africa. It also 
has the largest oil reserves in Africa (and significant natural gas reserves). It is 
important to note that the rebellion originated in eastern Libya which is also the center 
of oil production and refining.  Bush et al (2011) state that the “opposition in Benghazi 
offered Washington the opportunity for regime change. It offered an opportunity to 
install a Tripoli government that will be predictable, will accept neoliberal reform, the 
opening of Libya’s oil and gas sector and a military platform in a geo-strategically 
crucial part of Africa” (p.360).   
1.2.2 Education and Economic Opportunities:  
 
As mentioned before, there are many different factors and instabilities that had 
infiltrated the Arab regimes, bringing rise to the uprising. Basing ourselves on The 
Economist’s report published in 2011, these factors include “years in power of the 
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incumbent; size of the youth population cohort; democracy, corruption press freedom, 
and GDP per capita as a summary measure of economic performance.” Moreover, we 
have to take into consideration that any protest or movement that can play a role in 
bringing about political change or the rise of a new regime is usually due to other 
factors that can be combined with the economic challenges. These factors include for 
example, youth improvement, and social media and of course education or schooling. 
For instance, some scholars studied the empirical relationship between education and 
high standard of schooling and political participation. In their study published in 2012, 
Sondheimer and Green demonstrated the correlation between those two variables and 
the influence of this major player in the political movement, i.e. education. Their 
argument was based on the assumption that for nations to improve and for 
democratization to occur, an improvement in the quality of education and the 
availability of schooling must take place. On the macro level, this would mean that the 
higher the person is educated, the greater is his/her response and involvement in 
political activities. Political activities in this case would vary from participating in 
elections, demanding public reforms or even taking part in political movements such as 
demonstrations. This assumption was scientifically proven by a research done and 
published in 1995 by Putnam in which he justified that the level of educations is “the 
best individual –level predictor of political participation.” Furthermore, one has to also 
consider that economic development and improvement in the level of education will 
also become a threat to any authoritarian regime. This is also reflected in Huntington’s 
discourse published in 1968 which asserts that: “the higher the level of education of the 
unemployed… the more extreme the destabilizing behavior which results.”  
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  The quality of Education and the level of schooling have been major factor that 
has been improved in the last decades in the Arab region. We would therefore like to 
talk a little about this improvement in education and schooling opportunities that 
happened in the Arab region. In 2011, Robert Barro and Jong Lee published a study 
entitled “A new Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World” in which they 
provided quantitative information about the Arab countries and the level of education. 
The study reflects an analysis of 146 countries not only in the Arab world but also in 
Europe and Asia. The main distinguishing factor of this publication is that it calculated 
the average of total years schooling in the population above the age of 15 years old. In 
that regards, if we look the level of  education in Libya for example, we would see that 
as a country it had in 1980 a 3.26 percent increase in schooling reaching in 2010  a total 
of 7.85 per cent with an  average yearly increase in schooling of around 4.59 percent. 
Strangely enough is the fact that Libya preceded France in that ranking as well as Spain 
which had a 4.22 percent of increase. In that same regard, even Tunisia presented an 
increase in its educational attainment however was not as high as that of Libya scoring a 
4.07 percent increase in years of schooling. Looking at the numbers and percentages 
presented, we can argue that the development of the education level of the Arab states 
has mainly targeted the new sector called “poor labor market prospects”. This 
development influenced in a way the trajectory of the movements or protest. It can be 
seen as a sign of political instability that may have emerged in any of Libya or Tunis as 
a result of the increase in schooling and educational attainment, thus proving that there 
is a correlation between ones education and their involvement in the political life. 
Furthermore when analyzing the increase in the level of schooling and education in the 
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Arab region vis-à-vis the labor market, one can easily deduce that this increase in 
schooling presented a real dilemma at the level of the labor market which is normally 
weak. Laborers who have become educated and skilled people wanting to join the work 
force and enter the labor marked only to realize the reality of the situation where the 
labor market is weak, making it difficult for them to be part of it. Employment therefore 
becomes a major need in their life and in they would start looking for ways to tap the 
market which causes political instability. Here the major question would be asked: 
“why is it that a large expansion in schooling coupled with weak prospects for the 
workforce opens the door to political instability?” The major instruments that education 
provides the new generation with is learning, giving them the skills to analyze, research 
and problem solve. Thus they start to learn about their political system and researching 
the political system of other countries that are more developed and are able to offer their 
citizens good prospects in the labor force and high economy. This allows them to 
question, and aspire to be more like these countries. In the late 1980s, a huge part of the 
population in the Arab world was below the normal norm of education. This allowed 
the thriving of Arab regimes where the political leaders can be considered to be ideal. 
They are considered to be the only educated person and of course the most 
knowledgeable ruler. However as the population started to become more educated and 
the field of education and schooling developed,  the middle lower class of society have 
been given the opportunity to better understand their regime and the “mechanism” of 
the state. This may lead to an interpretation that “in the absence of democratic 
mechanisms for regime change, the societal pressures that had been building up in the 
Middle East against incumbents were pent up and eventually found expression in 
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popular outburst of protest.” (Chor, 2012) Having said that, this motive toward political 
involvements in the youth sector and a view of an absence democracy may lead to a 
shift toward protests in which it starts in a peaceful way. In that direction a simple 
hypothesis may be concluded namely that economic pressure may lead to employment 
gaps in the process of an education improvement and schooling increase will determine 
an uprising or any regime change under other terminologies.   
Initial protests in Libya started in mid-January however quickly turned violent. 
According to Bellamy & Williams (2011), this was partly because of the regime’s 
suppression and partly because of the establishment of an armed opposition group under 
the Interim Transitional National Council (TNC). Anti-government protests started in 
Libya on February 15, 2011 after the government had arrested a human rights activist. It 
escalated after the funeral of one of the victims that fell in the protest. Within 3 days, 
the opposition movement controlled most of Benghazi which is considered to be the 
second largest city in Libya.  On February 20, protests spread into Tripoli despite 
warning from Saif Al Islam Qaddafi, Muammar Al Qaddafi’s son that the country can 
fall into a civil war. The Libyan protests started out peacefully however Qaddafi 
violently opposed them.  Qaddafi’s army clashed with the opposition leading to battles 
which left thousands of people dead and brought about international condemnation.  
The opposition forces set up an interim government in Benghazi to oppose Colonel 
Qaddafi’s rule however despite their initial success, the government forces were able to 
regain control over much of the Mediterranean coast.  Furthermore, Qaddafi was heard 
speaking on a radio show where he vowed “We will come house by house, room by 
room…. We will find you in your closets. We will have no mercy and no pity” (as cited 
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in Bilefsky& Landler, 2011). Qaddafi, in an interview with ABC (Australia) also told 
the world that “officers have been deployed in all tribes and regions so that they can 
purify all decisions from these cockroaches” and “any Libyan who takes arms against 
Libya will be executed” (as cited in Ballany & Williams, 2011, p. 838).   This resulted 
in the resignation of a large number of Libyan officials and diplomats one of whom is 
the Libyan Ambassador to the United States Mr. Ali Aljuali.  
The Libyan opposition requested that the International community stand up and 
take action asking for a no-fly zone and immediate assistance.  On the 22nd of February, 
the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, called on the Libyan 
authorities to end the violence against the demonstrators which he believed may amount 
to ‘crimes against humanity’. On February 25, 2011; Libya’s UN Ambassador 
Mohammad Shalgham spoke against Qaddafi who he had previously considered a 
friend. According to Powell (2012), Shalgham explained that while he initially “could 
not believe” that Qaddafi’s troops were firing on the protesters, he had then actually 
seen Qaddafi call for the protests to be put down by force. Shalgham was therefore 
urging that the United Nations impose sanctions. Justifying his change of heart, he 
noted that those in the opposition “are asking for their freedom” and “are asking for 
their rights.” At a Security Council session in which his own deputy wept, Shalgham 
pointed out that initially the opposition “did not throw a single stone and they were 
killed,” and then stated, “I tell my brother Qaddafi: Leave the Libyans alone.” 
Shalgham said that the United Nations must intervene by imposing sanctions against 
Qaddafi, members of his family, and the military (p. 311).   A day later, on the 26th of 
February, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1970 which imposed sanctions on 
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Libya that includes an arms embargo, travel ban, and an asset freeze in addition to 
appointing the International Criminal Court to look into the Libyan situation. At this 
point the UN however did not authorize the use of force; however what Resolution 1970 
did, was it led to the issuing of a number of critical statements from key regional and 
multilateral organizations echoing the need to end the conflict in Libya. Russia on the 
other hand argued that the settlement of the conflict in Libya can only be done through 
political means. In a public statement, Russia confirmed that “… that is the purpose of 
the resolution… which imposes targeted, clearly expressed, restrictive measures with 
regard to those guilty of violence against the civilian population. However, it does not 
enjoin sanctions, even indirect, for forceful interference in Libya’s affairs, which could 
make the situation worse” (as cited in Bellany & Williams, 2011, p. 840).  It is thought 
that China, India, and Brazil shared that same view at the time which made it difficult to 
adopt more forceful measures.  
In a Statement by NATO’s Secretary General, he urged the Libyan authorities to 
halt the repression of its people. The European Union High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, delivered a declaration that condemned 
the violence in Libya and the hundreds of civilian deaths.  The African Union supported 
the Libyan people and declared that their aspirations for freedom, democracy, peace and 
justice are legitimate while the Gulf Cooperation Council demanded that the Security 
Council take extreme measures to end the violence taking place in Libya asking for a 
no-fly zone.  According to Powell (2012), it was the call of the Arab League that 
“turned the tide” in their statement that:  
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call[ed] on the Security Council to bear its responsibilities towards the 
deteriorating situation in Libya, and to take the necessary measures to impose 
immediately a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe 
areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the 
protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in Libya, while 
respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring States[.]”.  (as 
cited in Powell, 2012, p312).  
The Arab League’s statement asserted that the League would cooperate with the 
Transitional National Council of Libya that represented the Libyan opposition. This was 
a drastic change in the way the League did things as it  was the first time that it has ever 
sided with one regime over the other nor has it ever invited military intervention to 
protect the civilians of an Arab Country.  
Following the Arab League’s statement and call, on March 17, 2011, the United 
Nations Security Council adopted a Security Council resolution 1973 to authorize a no-
fly zone over Libya and to take all necessary steps needed to protect the civilians. 
Following the resolution on March 19, 2011 international intervention mainly from 
France, the United States and the United Kingdom took place to support the opposition 
against Qaddafi forces.  To support the efforts by France, the US and the UK, a 
coalition of 27 states from Europe and the Middle East joined the intervention aiding 
the opposition to capture tens of towns across the coast of Libya where most however 
were recaptured by the government. Bitter fighting continued across the country mainly 
in the west until finally in late August 2011, the opposition fighters were able to capture 
Tripoli marking the end of Qaddafi’s 42 years in power. Qaddafi however, was not yet 
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ready to admit defeat and regrouped his governmental institutions to Sirte which he 
declared to be Libya’s new capital. On October 20, 2011 fighters were able to take over 
Sirte and kill Qaddafi in the process.  
Without the massive support and military intervention in Libya by the 
international community, the Libyan people would not have been able to succeed in 
their uprising and be able to end the ruling of Qaddafi. According to Hasler (2012), “the 
international intervention, based on United Nations (UN) Resolution 19736, happened 
after an extraordinarily fast decision-making process. Humanitarian reasons were the 
decisive arguments of the participating nations and NATO for intervention.” 
1.3 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
 
In their article “Humanitarian Imperialism“ Bush et al (2011) state that the UN 
intervention in Libya specifically Council Resolution 1973, called for a cease fire in 
Libya as part of the 2005 UN World Summit which claimed that the international 
community has a “responsibility to protect”  (R2P) civilians.  
The 2011 intervention in Libya is the first time ever that the United Nations 
Security Council has implemented the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) principle thus 
transforming the international law’s approach to sovereignty and protection of civilians 
from a basic right to a responsibility. This intervention was motivated by a huge Libyan 
mass movement which in turn led the international community and the Security Council 
to act and protect the people of Libya from Qaddafi’s threat to “slaughter” his own 
people.  R2P assumes that states have the main responsibility to protecting its people 
while the international community only has a minor responsibility to protect mainly 
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preventing and responding to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. Using military intervention based on R2P is usually as last resort where all 
other measures must have failed. Powell (2012) asserts that it was the Libyan people 
through their opposition movement who have demanded the Security Council’s 
intervention to bring about effective civilian protection.  
According to R2P, each state has primary responsibility to protect its own 
inhabitants, but when a state is not willing or able to meet its own responsibility to 
protect, the principles of collective security mean that some portion of those 
responsibilities should be taken up by the international community, acting in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, to help build the necessary capacity or supply the necessary 
protection, as the case may be  (as cited in Powell, 2012, p. 299) 
 
Therefore the ceasefire in Libya was called for to bring an ‘end to the current 
attacks against civilians’, which might constitute ‘crimes against humanity’. Bush et al 
(2011) question the resolution, however, by stating that “R2P was used in the Libyan 
case as a pre-emptive rationale for intervention to prevent greater loss of civilian life 
after some had died in state violence, while in Syria thousands of civilians have actually 
been slain by security forces and repression in Yemen, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia has 
reinforced state power against demonstrators calling for political reform” (p. 358). The 
question here mainly is why is it that the R2P was used only in the Libyan case?   
According to the Executive Summary of Carnegie’s Commission on Preventing 
Deadly Conflict (1997), there are two approaches that can be used to prevent violence: 
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the operational prevention which is used in the face of immediate crisis and structural 
prevention which is used to make sure that there is no conflict that will arise in the first 
place or if it has arisen that it would not recur. In the case of the Libyan conflict, ending 
it was the main concern of the international community.  
The idea of “responsibility to protect” comes as a result of the 2005 UN summit in 
New York. As mentioned before, its main goal is to protect civil populations from: 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. If any of the 
principles are being violated, the UN is empowered to take collective action to save 
civilians. http://www.un.org/summit2005/presskit/fact_sheet.pdf (accessed May 8, 
2013). 
1.4 Why R2P in Libya?  
 
 If we are to compare the international intervention in Libya with the treatment 
of the different conflicts elsewhere particularly with the treatment of the conflict in 
Syria, the response of the global community was unique and surprising.  The revolution 
and the suppression/attack of the Libyan people by Qaddafi’s troops was only in its 32nd 
day when the international community took action and authorized a military 
intervention; however, the revolt in Syria has been taking place since March 15, 2011 
and as of yet no international military intervention has taken place after over 2 years on 
the start of the revolution.  If we are to look at this from the perspective of a purely 
humanitarian intervention that the international response in the two conflicts can be 
thought of as inexplicable and wrong especially since the movement in Syria is looking 
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for very similar demands as that in Libya – namely the need for more democracy, a 
higher standard of living and a better standard of life.  
There are many different opinions and speculations as to why a military 
intervention in Libya has taken place where as it almost impossible to happen in Syria.  
However one of the most prevalent arguments as to why there has been a distinction in 
both cases and therefore a difference in the responses according to Hasler (2012) is 
mainly due to 2 events:  “the publicly launched threats against the protestors of Qaddafi 
for the Libyan case, and the two-time Chinese and Russian rejection of any resolutions 
at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the Syrian case.”    
The key question that this paper is trying to address is why have international 
forces interfered in the Libyan uprising?  Why did the UN authorize a military 
intervention in Libya which is something that is unprecedented since its inception? 
What was the main purpose behind such interference and does it really fall under the 
reality of a humanitarian intervention and Responsibility to protect, or is there 
something else? According to Kinsman (2011) “the UN ordered international military 
action against a member state to prevent an expected massacre of civilians within its 
borders, rather than after a mass atrocity had occurred” (p.82). Yet if one is to look at 
the statement and claim from another angle, one can only ask why has this intervention 
taken place in Libya and not in Syria which is undergoing not only an uprising but also 
a start of what can be called a civil war within the country itself with hundreds of 
thousands of Syrians dead, internally displaced or forced out of the country altogether.  
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It is true that there have been grave human right violations in Libya and thus one 
can argue that the intervention in Libya falls under a “humanitarian intervention" and 
"responsibility to protect," driven mainly by humanitarian concerns over vulnerable 
populations subject to genocidal campaign; however arguably one can see that a realist 
perspective provoked by a power struggle could have been a major factor in the 
intervention. .  
In order to examine the above hypotheses, this thesis implements descriptive and 
analytical research methodology that examines the factors that have led to the putting of 
an end to the Libyan crisis and the humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, the thesis 
follows a comparative approach – at times comparing the situation in Libya to what is 
currently taking place in Syria to find a pattern and an explanation for the lack of action 
in Syria and potentially a more valid explanation to the intervention in Libya.   
The thesis explores the idea that unlike what has been outwardly expressed that 
the intervention in Libya was mainly a humanitarian intervention, the main reason 
behind this international intervention is in essence based on the balance of power 
approach and looking at the realpolitik of the situation/crisis where the international 
community has been trying to gain power over Qaddafi and thus be able to control 
Libya which is not only strategically located but also rich in resources.  
The research question is vital on an international level. The new interference or 
dominance of the major powers in the third world countries presents an interesting case 
to study and analyze. Hence, this thesis reflects the major points and interferences in 
addition to the ways that they have been used in order to legalize the intervention in 
Libya. The Security Council resolution that was adopted and that permitted the NATO 
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military intervention presents a real case to monitor in the presence of the Arab 
Uprising and the new waves of democracy in the Middle East.  
To fulfill its purpose, the thesis is therefore divided into 5 main sections: an 
introduction, a literature review, methodology, analysis, and conclusion. While this 
chapter being the introduction deals with a brief history of Libya, the Libyan uprising 
and the nature of the intervention, chapter 2 places the intervention into theoretical 
perspective particularly looking at the 2 main opposing theories of international 
relations namely that of humanitarian intervention and realism which are to be 
discussed throughout the thesis.  Chapter 3 offers an overview of the methodology used 
in the paper leading us to chapter 4 where an analysis of the intervention in light of the 
theoretical framework provided in the second chapter. Finally chapter 5 concludes the 
thesis and offers recommendations. 
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Chapter Two 
Liberal Realism versus Idealism 
Intervention: theoretical perspectives 
 
The United Nations was established in 1945 as a means to counter the atrocities 
that happened in World War 2 and to prevent the occurrence of a third world war.  It is 
“committed to maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly 
relations among nations and promoting social progress, better living standards and 
human rights.” 
 According to the United Nations Charter, the main purpose of the UN is:  
1. To maintain international peace and security,  
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; 
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems 
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character,  
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of 
these common ends. (retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml on May 15, 2013)  
The United Nations can be argued to follow both an idealist and liberal realist 
approach to International Affairs.  Idealists believe in the natural goodness of humans 
and that there are international moral principles which govern the way the world 
works.  They believe in civil and political liberties, human rights, democracy and 
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protection from arbitrary power. The UN can fall under what is called “liberal 
institutionalism” which believes in cooperation between states and nations to achieve 
the “absolute gain” for all. These gains include peace and security, economic growth, 
as well as social and cultural gains. As Nurruzaman (2006) puts it “Mutual interests 
of states minimize differences, pave the avenues for cooperation. States become 
willing to cooperate once institutions (sets of rules and practices that prescribe roles, 
constrain activity and shape the expectations of actors) are seen as beneficial. States 
are rational actors; they maximize absolute gains through cooperation and are less 
concerned about relative gains made by other states”(Nurruzaman, 2006, p. 242).  
However if one is to look at the UN and the way it functions from another angle, the 
UN system is not as simplistic and “humanitarian” as its charter puts it out to be. The 
way it functions with 5 permanent members representing the World’s largest powers 
having the decision making power for global cooperation or negligence can itself be 
argued through the realist ideas of power balance.       
2.1 Liberal Realism 
 Realism argues that all nation states are motivated by one and only one thing: 
their national interest which can only be defined in terms of the nation’s power. 
According to Morgenthau (1978), there are six main principles that political realists 
adhere to. The first main principle states that in order to improve society, one has to 
know the laws that govern it. This means that one needs to see the history of how the 
country was and from that one can deduce how it will be.  The second main principle 
of political realism is that of interest defined as power. Statesmen act on their own 
interests to assume power. This allows one to predict the past, present and future of 
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politics. Thirdly, the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period 
of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy 
is formulated. The same observations apply to the concept of power. Its content and 
the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power 
may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. 
Forth and in contradiction to liberal idealists, political realism holds a lot of 
significance for moral action. An individual may think of doing justice and letting all 
else perish yet as a state this cannot happen since a state is responsible for all those in 
its care. In the fifth principle Morgenthau states that “political realism refuses to 
identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern 
the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes 
between truth and idolatry.” Finally the sixth principle of political realism 
emphasizes the autonomy of the political sphere. In other words the political realist is 
not unaware of the existence of other schools of thought yet, takes issue with the 
“legalistic-moralistic” approach to international affairs. Political realists stand their 
ground in interests defined by power and nothing else.  
Therefore, as can be deduced from above, realism is not a theory that can easily 
be defined as it is based on a set of different assumptions and propositions which 
formulate a way of thinking or orientation rather than a definition itself. It is more of a 
philosophy of international relations which follows a trend more than anything else.  
Box 1.1, taken from Donelly 2000, p 6-7; outlines some basic trends when defining 
realism.  
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Looking at the above box which includes the representative definition of realism one 
can see a pattern in terms of the assumptions that realism puts forth.  
 The most important three assumptions about realism according to Maessen (2012) are: 
(1) The state-centric assumption; i.e that states are the most important actors in 
the international system, (2) that they act in such a way as to maximize their 
national interest, the rational-actor assumption, and finally (3) that the 
international system is in a state of anarchy (p.7).  
Realists believe and emphasize egoism and self-interest in international politics. 
Because of those self-interested passions, realists believe that conflict is inevitable and 
is constant. This state of anarchy or conflict allows for and actually encourages the 
worst in human beings.  To realists, it’s always about power, self-interest and balancing 
the power dynamic in order to serve one’s (or a state’s) interest.  
2.2 Liberal Idealism 
 
There have been many definitions of humanitarian intervention.  Intervention as 
seen by Terry Nardin is “the exercise of authority by one state within the jurisdiction of 
another state, but without its permission” (as cited in Lang, 2009, p.134). For Nardin 
and Williams (2006), the intervention would then be seen as humanitarian if it is aimed 
to protect the people who are “not nationals of the intervening state from violence 
perpetrated or permitted by the government of the target state”.  Another definition of 
humanitarian intervention is put forth by Oppenheim who defined what it means to 
intervene and thus hold an intervention generally as "dictatorial interference by a state 
in the affairs of another state for the purpose of maintaining or ordering the actual 
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conditions of things.”(as cited in Ocran, 2002, p. 8). According to Ocran (2002), 
humanitarian intervention has been defined as "the justifiable use of force for the 
purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment so arbitrary and 
persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within which the sovereign is presumed to 
act with reason and justice."(p.8) whereas Jeff Holzgrefe argues that it is “the threat or 
use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or 
ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals 
other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory 
force is applied’ (as cited in Lang 2009, p.134).  
There are many ways in which countries provide humanitarian intervention. 
Humanitarian intervention can be given out in the form of material assistance through 
relief and aid such as food, medical supplies etc… or even in the form of sanctions 
which would affect the country and exert nonmilitary pressure to try and prevent 
abusive practices that are happening in the country. Finally, humanitarian intervention 
can take the form of military intervention that would forcefully stop the human 
atrocities that are taking place. This military armed response can be done by both 
outsiders and compatriots only at times when the acts that are done “shock the moral 
conscience of mankind.” Therefore these acts include:  
(1) genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other 
atrocities involving loss of life on a massive scale; (2) interference with the 
delivery of humanitarian relief to endangered civilian populations; and (3) 
the collapse of civil order entailing substantial loss of life, in situations 
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where it is impossible to identify any authority capable of granting consent 
to international involvement to help restore order. (Ocran, 2002, p. 9) 
2.3 Responsibility to Protect 
 
Upon authorizing the Security Council Resolution 1973 under the responsibility to 
protect, the United Nations argued that it was done more as a humanitarian intervention. 
It is still to be determined whether or not it is really done for humanitarian purposes.  
However what is a humanitarian intervention and how can one place Responsibility to 
Protect under that framework? This section will delve deeper into the United Nations’ 
“responsibility to protect” and its claims on how it falls into the bracket of humanitarian 
intervention.  It will also look deeper into the concept of Realism and balance of power 
as a relevant argument and theoretical perspective that could be adopted in the case of 
the Libyan intervention. 
 
According to Evans & Sahnoun (2002), using an alternative language from the 
“intervention” to “protection” comes as a way to move from the term humanitarian 
intervention and the debates that have come on whether it is legal or not. This change in 
terminology leads to a conceptual shift regarding the essence of sovereignty and from 
“control” to “responsibility” thus changing the dimension of security to become more 
encompassing of a global community and not that of individual states. The idea of state 
sovereignty has always been the state’s ability to make authoritative decisions regarding 
its people and resources.  This principle of sovereignty is protected in the UN charter in 
Article 2 section 1 just like nonintervention is embedded in article 2 section 7: “a 
sovereign state is empowered by international law to exercise exclusive and total 
32 
 
jurisdiction of its territorial borders, and other states have the corresponding duty not to 
intervene in its internal affairs.” (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p. 101). However, over the 
decades since the signing of the UN Charter in 1946, there has been many instances in 
which countries have had to interfere in other country’s sovereignty for human security 
purposes and to protect the livelihood of the people. This is a huge contradiction to the 
concept of sovereignty and what is actually practiced in the world.  It has led to a need 
to change in the understanding of the concept of sovereignty from one where the state 
holds absolute power to do whatever it wants to its people and within its’ state 
boundaries to one that holds more of a dual responsibility. This dual responsibility is 
characterized by the need to respect the sovereignty of other countries on an external 
level and internally to respect and protect the rights and dignity of all its people within 
the state. Although this “new” principle of sovereignty is not part of international law, 
however among international human rights covenants and UN practice, “sovereignty as 
responsibility has become the minimum content for good international citizenship” and 
is recognized as the “responsibility to protect” (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p. 102).  
 
In December 2011, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) introduced the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which was endorsed 
by the 2005 UN World Summit. Articles 138 and 139 of the summit’s outcome 
document stated:  
 
Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This 
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responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, 
through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and 
will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as 
appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and 
support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, to help protect populations from war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective 
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in 
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis 
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. (as cited in Bellamy, XXX, p. 104) 
 
The responsibility to protect includes three different dimensions:  
 The responsibility to prevent  
 The responsibility to react, and  
 The responsibility to rebuild 
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Therefore R2P implies that there is duty to react to situations in cases where there is 
need for human protection. These measures are preventative and should be taken to 
ensure protection. If however preventative measures fail, then coercive measures such 
as economic, judicial or political should be followed through and if those fail then 
finally military measures could be taken in extreme cases only. However what are the 
extreme cases and how can they be justified?  According to Evans & Sahnoun (2002), 
there are 6 principles that need to be justified if one is to follow through with a military 
intervention. These principles are the following:  
1. The “just-cause threshold” mainly encompassing the fact that there is a large 
scale of loss of life or a large scale ethnic cleansing.  
2. The presence of the right “intention” that is to say that intervening states are 
taking part in the intervention to halt or avert human suffering. This can be 
measured by the extent to which the people themselves are with the intervention 
and support it.  
3. The intervention should be a “last resort”: military intervention can only be 
justified if and only if all other options and strategies for solving the crisis have 
been exhausted and tried.  
4. The means of the intervention should be “proportional” meaning that planned 
military intervention should be done in such a way that it is the minimum 
needed to secure the protection and safety of the people. 
5. The intervention should be based on “reasonable prospects” that is to say that 
the chances of carrying out the intervention and having it succeed to alleviate or 
halt the suffering of the people is reasonable 
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6. The intervention should be called for and carried out by the “right authority” 
namely called for by the Security Council.  
The concept of responsibility to protect has been reaffirmed in the Security Council 
in 2006 (Resolution 1674), however there has been difficulty in its implementation and 
in translating the international support of this concept on the ground. This is mainly due 
to the fact that many countries thought of it as just another way to justify humanitarian 
intervention. Therefore, there is a main confusion happening between the relationships 
of R2P with non-consensual military intervention. 
Prior to 2011 and since its recognition as important in the realm of protection 
and security; the idea of R2P has only been mentioned in documents and never acted 
upon. However this changed in the case of Libya, where for the first time responsibility 
to protect was implied in Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973: “ recalling the 
Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population” and “… to take all necessary 
measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country” ; respectively.  
2.4 Realism and the Responsibility to Protect 
 
 When defining the two terms realism and responsibility to protect, one can 
notice that they are two very contradictory terms. The concept of the responsibility to 
protect challenges the basics of realism. It assumes that states have an ethical obligation 
to protect the people of other countries if their own country is not able to protect them 
and thus countries have the right and obligation to interfere in the sovereignty of other 
countries justifying it through an ethical perspective. Realism on the other hand 
assumes that no country or state would interfere in another country unless the 
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interference in beneficial to the country. The basis of realism looks at the question of 
“what’s it in for me?”, rather than looking at the global good.   
Furthermore, one can argue that the responsibility to protect is a Western idea 
that serves the interests of the West in order to impose its liberal values and ideas on 
other countries and thus serving its own interests which would then mean that the idea 
of the responsibility to protect is but a reinforcement of realist ideals and ideas serving 
the interests of the major Western countries.  
2.5 Placing the intervention in perspective based on the theoretical 
framework 
 
2.5.1 The humanitarian approach in the Libyan Crisis 
If one is to look at cases of international humanitarian crisis and the theories that 
govern them and the interventions that take place one can find that there are many 
debates taking place on whether these interventions fall under the category of being 
legitimately humanitarian and desirable or if they fail to do so.  One criterion to assess 
the “humanitarian” aspect of an intervention is identified by Michael Walzer as an 
intervention that comes in response to actions “that have shocked the conscience of 
mankind” (as cited in Maessen, 2012, p. 17).  Under these criteria, then the intervention 
would fail to fall under a humanitarian one as it took place before Qadaffi was able to 
shock mankind; it actually took place to prevent Qaddafi from doing so.  
On the other hand, Fernando Tesón’s has a different understanding of human 
rights and the liberal approach. Tesón argues that for a humanitarian intervention to be 
thought of justified, the intervention should be one that “ aims at ending severe tyranny 
or anarchy (...) this standard does not necessarily require that genocide or a similar 
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massive crime should be afoot” (Tesón, 2011, p. 194).  If one is to look at this as a 
criteria, then the intervention in Libya can be justified as a humanitarian intervention 
since Qaddafi had announced several times that he was looking to “clean the dirt and 
scum” referring to the people of Libya that were rebelling against the regime.  
Finally, Nicholas Wheeler, takes an approach that is permissive of preventive 
humanitarian intervention linking the intervention to the hope of saving lives that could 
not be saved if an outside intervention does not take place or even addressing genocide 
or mass murder. To Wheeler, the intervention should come as a last resort and all 
decision makers should be convinced that the outcome is humanitarian. Looking at it 
from Wheeler’s perspective, the Libyan intervention would also be highly justified 
especially taking into consideration Qaddafi’s March 16 speech in which he said, “  We 
will march to clean Libya, inch by inch, house by house, home by home, alley by alley , 
person by person…”  
2.5.2 R2P in the Libyan Crisis 
 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
has put forth guiding principles for humanitarian intervention under the responsibility to 
protect. If one is to argue for the responsibility to protect as a legitimate action and 
driving force behind the intervention, three main principles must be satisfied: large 
scale loss of life, either actual or intended which comes as a result of direct state action 
or neglect or inability to act; the intention of the intervening states is to ‘halt or avert’ 
human suffering; the intervention is done by the right authorities. Looking at those 
principles that have been set by the ICISS, one cannot argue that the intervention was 
not legitimate as Qaddafi had threatened his people, the intention was to halt or avert 
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human suffering – at least on the short term – and the UN can be seen as an appropriate 
authority to carry out such an intervention. However, there are critics to this.  
According to Pattison (2011), it is true that the situation in Libya was in need of 
an intervention particularly due to Qaddafi’s threatening of his people, however what is 
not justified is the “forcible regime change by an external party in support of a rebel 
movement” (p.272).  Pattison challenges the intent of the intervention on whether it was 
to protect the civilians or to overthrow Qaddafi citing the fact that forced changes in 
regime have historically proven to do more harm than good.  
Furthermore, according to Allin and Jones (as cited in Hasler, 2012,  p. 21), “the 
Libyan intervention is seen as illegitimate because the United States, France and Britain 
are not also intervening in states such as Bahrain, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Syria and Saudi Arabia where authoritarian regimes and violations of human rights are 
also clearly present.” The decision not to intervene in these countries as well although 
the situation there is as equally serious as Libya, is evidence that the primary motive of 
the intervention isn’t based primarily on a humanitarian motive.  
The concept of responsibility to protect emerged in 2001; however since its 
emergence no real interventions have taken place under this concept. It is only until a 
decade later, in 2011, that the intervention in Libya was called for under the principle of 
the responsibility to protect the people of Libya. Hasler (2012) argues that “R2P 
represents more of a normative idea and argument than a mandatory rule, policy or 
strategy. The normative power of R2P shapes its importance within the discussion about 
interventions and their rationale” (p.46). Having said this, what were the real reasons 
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and motivations for the intervention in Libya? Were they based solely on humanitarian 
factors? 
2.5.3 Idealism in the Libyan Crisis 
 
The Libyan crisis has been characterized by gross violations of human rights. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, Qaddafi himself had announced that he will show “no mercy” 
to the Libyan rebels. In his speech of February 22, 2011 Qaddafi said that he would 
rather die a martyr than step down urging his supporters to attack “the cockroaches” 
(that are his people) and “cleanse the houses” one by one until all protestors 
surrendered.  These statements are ones that could be interpreted as beginnings of 
genocide which in themselves are justifications for an idealist intervention in the 
country. In this case, R2P is used to prevent large scale loss of life the Qaddafi has been 
threatening to abolish. 
2.5.4 Realism in the Libyan Crisis 
 
Looking back at the Realistic approach to international affairs and its defining 
principles, one can see that when it comes to state of anarchy in world politics, states do 
not intervene if they could not gain anything from the process. There always is a hidden 
“what’s in it for me?” benefit. States only intervene if they could gain more influence, 
or power – maybe not in the country itself but over other countries that could be seen as 
competitive. According to Hasler (2012), realism as a theory includes aspects 
“postulating that an action is good only if it produces certain desirable outcomes.” 
(p.48).  
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It is true that states have a responsibility to protect based on humanitarian principles 
and concepts, however rarely does the humanitarian aspect of things motivate states and 
countries to intervene. The moral/ethical dimension of protection is always 
overshadowed by hidden purposes and global interests. Countries do not intervene on 
their own accord or when the intervention does not serve their interests regardless of 
how big the atrocities are especially since the countries themselves have a responsibility 
to the protection of their own people and to ensuring their wellbeing/ interests whether  
on an economic, political or security level.  
When it comes to Global Power interests, one of their main concerns is the gain of 
resources. In this respect, Libyan oil played a major role in the decision to intervene in 
the country. Moreover, another interest would lie in the political homogeneity of the 
countries namely between the US and Libya especially when it comes to an agreement 
on Israel and its future within the new Arab Spring.  And finally the relationship of the 
countries with the Qaddafi regime especially when it comes to the negative relationship 
Qaddafi had with the US, France and Arab countries also played a role in the 
intervention.  
Hence this thesis argues that although the intervention was authorized under the 
concept of responsibility to protect, the global powers would not have intervened if their 
interests would not have been served. Their interests served as the main drive to the 
intervention while using R2P as a cover.  
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The coming chapters will examine the motivations behind the interventions – 
whether idealist or realist in nature and thus will reveal in light of the findings what 
could be done in other countries such as Syria.  
 
  
42 
 
Chapter Three 
Methodology 
 
The main aim of this research is to determine whether the intervention in Libya 
was driven by liberal idealism or realism. The chapter describes the qualitative research 
methodology that is used to achieve its purpose. The purpose of this study is to explain 
the different factors that have accompanied the intervention. In order to ascertain one 
hypothetical proposition or another, it implements a rational choice analysis approach to 
the key actors namely France and the US in their rapprochement towards military 
interventionism placing it in the framework of Carnegie’s Commission on Preventing 
Deadly Conflict. These concepts guide chapter 4’s findings on how the intervention in 
Libya was governed by political interests based on realism.  
3.1. Research Questions:  
 
The purpose of the research questions is to analyze the conflict from a political level. 
The importance of the research questions is to allow us to triangulate the content.  
 Why has the UN authorized military interference in Libya? 
 How is the Libyan conflict connected to power struggles of the international 
community particularly for France and the US?  
 The very crucial factors that have led to the development of the military 
intervention in response to the conflict in Libya are based on the assessment that the 
international community has done with respect to the national interests that they hold.  
There are 3 different factors that have led to the intervention in Libya:  
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 An economic factor based on oil and the interest in controlling the oil in 
Libya  
 Qaddafi’s political affiliation and his view point of World politics 
particularly when it comes to the Israeli – Arab Conflict  
 Qaddafi’s relationship with countries of the West – namely the US and 
France who have readily supported military interference in Libya as a 
means to their own political interests  
3.2 Research Design:  
 
As mentioned above, this thesis uses qualitative analysis in its design. One of 
the most well-known qualitative means of analyzing data is through the use of a case 
study. Being flexible in its design, the case study is the best method to describe how 
realpolitik underlies the nature of the intervention in the Libyan conflict especially since 
the data is not quantifiable through a survey or any other means. This case therefore 
reaches the conclusion through triangulation - a method used by qualitative researchers 
to check and establish validity in their studies by analyzing a research question from 
multiple perspectives (Guioin et al, 2002).   
Although the debate on having a humanitarian intervention is common and is 
found in extensive literature, books and articles, the information on the intervention in 
Libya and the outcome of this intervention is still lacking in the scholarship realm. 
Therefore to assess and evaluate the processes that have led to the way that the states 
dealt with the developments and outcomes in Libya this thesis relies on: 
 (1) Articles, reports, journal articles and newspaper analyses 
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(2) Foreign policy statements and interviews with politicians and witnesses of 
the process taken from media sources   
(3) Reports from open media sources;   
(4) Data from open sources, required for verifying the analysis 
Furthermore the study looks at formal political theory at both the domestic and 
international levels to reach its conclusion. Looking at political theory allows us to have 
a more in depth understanding of the conflict.  The theory is then assessed through the 
framework of the Carnegie Commission for Preventing Deadly Conflict. By 
triangulating the date derived from using observation and formal theory, conclusions 
can be derived more accurately.  
3.3 Methodology:  
 
The sampling undertaken for this study includes various actors from within 
Libya and other regional and international actors.  It analyzes both what was happening 
in Libya on an internal level as well as the responses on an international level. The 
importance of looking at both the local and international levels is that it allows us to 
have a more in-depth understanding of the power struggle taking place – thus applying 
the rational choice of the key actors in Libya – namely for the purpose of this paper: 
France and the US.  According to Lovett (2006), Rational Choice Theory is an approach 
that can be characterized by three core assumptions. The first is that every individual’s 
or collective’s actions are purposeful. No action takes place without purpose and 
without deliberately selecting one or more courses of action. The second assumption 
that the theory is based on is that of utility. The purposeful act that is chosen is based on 
its functionality and needs to give maximum service to the individual or collective. 
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Finally, the third assumption is that decisions taken are based on rationality and thus are 
well thought of and balanced. In the case of countries and nations, the Rational Choice 
Theory can thus be argued to include actions that come as a result of National interest 
which according to Gruenwald (2011),  can be defined as the interest of the state , 
interpreted by the government, as what is best for the nation itself and its relationship 
with others. Gruenwald goes further to explain that national interest could be described 
in terms of 3 interconnected ideas: national security, increased economy (prosperity) 
and prestige (country’s image held by nations and the global society). The significance 
of looking at the rational choices of the key actors is to explore the realpolitik 
dimension of the conflict.  
3.3.1 Further Methodology 
 
As mentioned above, the methodology chosen for this case study is Data 
Triangulation. Data triangulation involves the use of different sources to come up with 
the conclusion. This thesis relies on observation and formal theory to reach its 
conclusion –the role that realpolitik played in the intervention.   
Point A in the triangulation is namely the observation of actions that led to the 
intervention in Libya. This observation point is conducted through content analysis – 
reviewing primary and secondary sources on the Libyan conflict and the intervention 
that took place. The publications include but are not limited to op-eds, official 
statements, data surveys, and daily periodicals.  
Point B explores the formal theory that evaluates both the domestic and 
international powers. Question 1 looks at the factors that have allowed the interference 
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in Libya while Question 2 analyzes the gains that both the US and France have at stake 
if the intervention were not to take place. The major theoretical principals are sued to 
explain the positions of the US and France with respect to the Libyan conflict and the 
intervention that resulted.  
 
                                                                  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore an examination of the rapprochement of military intervention in 
Libya through the lens of Carnegie’s commission on preventing Deadly Conflict is used 
in order to better study the idealism v/s realism debate that governs it. The Carnegie 
Commission on preventing Deadly Conflict was established in May 1994 to address the 
“looming threats to world peace” through the use of violence as a means to end 
intergroup conflict. Through studying of various conflicts around the world, the 
Commission sought to find effective ways to prevent violence and to identify solutions.   
  The Commission on preventing deadly conflict provides an ideal 
analytical framework for looking at the conflict and its responses based on the situation 
Observation of actions that led 
to the intervention in Libya 
 
Realpolitik at play  
 Application of 
 Political Theory  
 
A B 
C 
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governing it and assessing the countries’ national interests in that regards. The 
significance of the Commission’s work is that it underlines the effective preventative 
strategies needed to ensure the end of violent conflict and for constructive humanitarian 
intervention to take place.  In analyzing the responses and factors that came into play to 
end the conflict through military intervention, through the lens of the Carnegie 
framework, the political underpinnings are highlighted.   
Finally and in conclusion, the paper briefly attempts to explain why despite the 
large humanitarian crisis that Syria is currently facing, military intervention has taken 
place in Libya and not Syria by also looking at the national interests of the key actors 
involved.  
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Chapter Four 
Analysis of the International Intervention in Libya 
 
According to the Executive Summary of Carnegie’s Commission on Preventing 
Deadly Conflict (1997), there are two approaches that can be used to prevent violence: 
the operational prevention which is used in the face of immediate crisis and structural 
prevention which is used to make sure that there is no conflict that will arise in the first 
place or if it has arisen that it would not recur. In the case of the Libyan conflict, ending 
it was the main concern of the international community. Operational prevention 
according to the report mainly relies on early communication and engagement that can 
help come up with the conditions that are needed for leaders to resolve the conflict. 
Four key elements exist in such a situation:  
1. A lead player usually an international organization, country, or important 
individual who works to mobilize preventative efforts.  
2. A coherent political-military approach that is designed to stop the violence, 
address the humanitarian needs of the situation and integrate all political and 
military parts of the problem  
3. Enough resources to support preventative engagement to stop the conflict  
4. A plan to restore the country’s authority 
 
The Libyan crisis is one that threatened the livelihood of hundreds of thousands of 
Libyans and predicted a humanitarian crisis similar to the one that happened in Rwanda.  
From a humanitarian perspective, this crisis had to stop. Below is a description of the 
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different strategies/factors that helped put an end to the conflict in Libya.  However, as 
is noted in the section below, the factors did help end the conflict yet the ending of the 
conflict was not purely motivated by humanitarian concerns, rather interests played a 
role in the decision to ending the conflict.  
4.1 The Role of the Leaders 
 
According to the report, “effective leadership derives from a special relationship or 
capacity that makes an organization, government agency, or prominent individual the 
logical focal point for rallying the help of the international community… in most cases, 
the active support of the UN Security Council – especially the permanent members – is 
important to success.” (p.xx) 
On February 22, 2011; Qaddafi spoke to his supporters from an old bombed residence 
of his in Tripoli that was hit by U.S. airstrikes in the 1980s and left unrepaired as a 
symbol of defiance. In that speech Qaddafi was heard saying:  "Libya wants glory, 
Libya wants to be at the pinnacle, at the pinnacle of the world," he proclaimed, 
pounding his fist on the podium. "I am a fighter, a revolutionary from tents ... I will die 
as a martyr at the end," he said, vowing to fight "to my last drop of blood." (CBS 
Interactive, 2011).  Although having his aircrafts bomb Benghazi, Qaddafi lived a stage 
of denial in which he asserted that he had never ordered a single bullet fired till that day, 
warning that if he had done that then everything would  burn. Furthermore in the same 
speech, Qaddafi said that if protests didn't end, he would stage a "holy march" with 
millions of supporters to cleanse Libya….."No one allows his country to be a joke or let 
a mad man separate a part of it”….  It is Qaddafi’s provocative speech that left the 
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international community including his own diplomats fear the start of crimes against 
humanity and call for a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and a decisive humanitarian 
intervention. 
As noted earlier, it is the courage of senior Libyan diplomats in standing up against 
Qaddafi that helped move the normative focus from the conventional state-centered 
notion of sovereignty to the more fundamental, democratic question of who bears 
sovereignty (Powell, 2012, p.311). In a statement in front of the Security Council, 
Libyan Ambassador to the UN Mohammed Shalgham told the Council “Please, the 
United Nations, save Libya. Let there be no bloodshed, no killing of innocents…. We 
want a decisive, rapid and courageous resolution from you” (AFP, 2011).  
If it were not for the Libyan diplomats who had changed direction from 
advocating the regime to asking for help from the international community, or for 
Qaddafi’s radical speeches, it would have been much more difficult to get the 
international community to advocate for military intervention especially under the 
umbrella of R2P. For R2P to be considered legitimate it needs the backing of the people 
of the country. The Libyan diplomats’ position in the Security Council paved the way 
for the intervention. Yet again, was the intervention really done only for humanitarian 
purposes?  
4.2 The Role of the United Nations, International Community and 
Security Council 
 
 Before military action is taken, the international community works on trying to at least 
restore the country’s authority through looking at early warning signals, using 
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preventive diplomacy, economic measures such as sanctions and inducements. If all 
else fails then comes the use of force which is the last resort to solving the conflict. Is 
that really what the international community did?  
The first start to preventing a deadly conflict is the use of early warning signs 
and early response. According to the report, “indicators of imminent violence include 
widespread human right abuses, increasingly brutal political oppression, inflammatory 
use of the media, the accumulation of arms and sometimes a rash of organized killing.” 
(p. xxi) . During the early stage of the crisis, policy makers and the international 
community usually are attentive to the situation and how it might worsen. They become 
alert of the different opportunities that could help avoid violence. One of the most 
disruptive things that could happen is early action which is usually avoided through 
preventative diplomacy.  For successful preventative diplomacy to take place, there are 
a number of steps that can be taken. The first is for states to resist the urge to suspend 
diplomatic relations. Instead, there should be a strengthening of communication with 
the leaders and groups in crisis. Second governments and international organizations 
must express in clear ways the interests that are at stake. As a third step the crisis must 
be put on the agenda of the UN Security Council or relevant bodies so as to keep track 
of the developments in the crisis and the different updates and finally there is an 
imperative that there must be a broadening of the multilateral context of an unfolding 
crisis where governments need to be attentive to all opportunities that arise and can 
support quiet diplomacy and dialogue between the leaders in the crisis. Thus comes the 
role of special envoys or representatives of key states or regional organizations to 
demonstrate their case in the early stages of a crisis (the role of mediation in the Libyan 
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conflict will be discussed in the coming section). Another very powerful tool that the 
international community holds when it comes to a conflict is the forcing of a number of 
economic measures one of which is the use of sanctions. According to the Executive 
Summary of the Preventing Deadly Conflict Report, “sanctions serve three broad policy 
functions for governments: to signal international concern to the offending state, to 
punish a state’s bad behavior, and to serve as a precursor to stronger actions, including, 
if necessary the use of force” (p. xxiv).  
4.2.1 The Role of the Security Council 
 
On February 26, 2011, the Security Council adopted Security Council 
Resolution 1970. This resolution came welcoming of all previous statements and 
stances taken by the international community from the Arab League, to UNHCR, and 
the Arab Union and was mindful of the Security Council’s primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security. It therefore called on and urged the 
Libyan authorities to stop the violence and ensure access to international human rights 
monitors. Furthermore, the resolution brought about sanctions to Libya which included 
an arms embargo, a travel ban, and an asset freeze. The resolution also referred the case 
of Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC). It is important to note that 
Resolution 1970 is only the second time the Security Council has asked the 
ICC to investigate a situation (Dunne &Gifkins).  
Furthermore, on March 17, 2011, the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 
(2011) called for a ceasefire in Libya and an ‘end to the current attacks against 
civilians’, which might constitute ‘crimes against humanity’. The resolution imposed a 
no-fly zone over Libya, sanctions against the government and authorized ‘all possible 
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force’ to protect civilians. The resolution was adopted by 10 in favor, none against and 
with abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India and the Russian Federation).   
Security Council Resolutions are very important in resolving conflicts yet one 
can argue that both resolutions in the case of Libya did not help in putting an end to the 
conflict in the most efficient manner.  
If we are to look only at Resolution 1973, we can say that this is based on the 
“responsibility to protect” since it focuses mainly on the ‘protection of civilians and 
civilian populates areas’ without seemingly choosing sides. Yet, the 2001 ICISS report 
also talks about the “responsibility to prevent: to address both the direct and indirect 
causes of the internal conflict” (ICISS, 2011, p.7) and therefore one can make the 
argument that in this case, it is very difficult to address and look at the root causes of 
the conflict without taking sides and having the intervention that is dictated to take 
sides.  
Furthermore, Resolution 1973 worked on imposing a no-fly zone over Libya to 
protect its civilians. However, according to Maessen (2012), “considering that the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine attaches great value to both national sovereignty and 
proportional means, stating that ‘the scale, duration, and intensity of planned military 
intervention should be at the minimum necessary to secure the defined human 
protection objective’, it is hard to think of a way that intervening militarily would fit 
better within the responsibility to protect framework; having no boots on the ground 
minimizes both the breach to Libyan territorial sovereignty and the intrusiveness of an 
intervention” (p.33).  
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When it comes to the authorization of the international criminal court, it can be 
argued that this authorization has undermined Libyan efforts at liberation. In an article 
published by Al-Jazeera on March 20,2011; Bali and Abou Rish argue that the first 
priority that the Security Council should have looked at was to negotiate an exit strategy 
for Qaddafi and his family similar to what had been done for Ben Ali and Mubarak 
before him. Instead however, the ICC referral signaled to Qaddafi that neither he nor his 
family will be able to find refuge thus increasing his resolve to fight to the very end.  
On March 21, 2011, the International Peace Bureau (IPB) strongly condemned 
the "no-fly zone" in Libya. If one is to compare the previous experiences in Iraq 2003, a 
better option would probably have been to actually continue the sanction process a bit 
further rather than rush into military intervention not even a month after the resolution 
1970 was in place. Adhering and respecting the cease-fire agreement coupled with 
negotiations may have given a better outcome in Libya.  Furthermore, in an article 
entitled “Attacking Libya and International Law” written for Al Ahram newspaper on 
March 24, 2011, Doebbler argues that the Security Resolution 1973 does not come in 
line with international law.  According to Doebbler, perhaps the most fundamental 
principle of international law is that no state shall use force against another state. This 
principle is expressly stated in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter. No state can 
violate this principle of international law. While the UN Security Council can order the 
use of force in exceptional circumstances, according to Article 24(2) of the UN Charter, 
the Council "shall act in accordance with the Principles and Purposes of the United 
Nations." This means, at least, that when peaceful means of dispute resolution are still 
possible the options for authorising the use of force are extremely limited. In the present 
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case, the Security Council appears to have rushed to use force. Narrow exceptions to the 
prohibition of the use of force are found in Article 51 and Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. The latter provisions, especially Article 42, allow the Security Council to take 
action that "may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." 
Both resolutions 1970 and 1973 state that they are being adopted under Chapter VI; 
neither, however, meets the requirements of Article 42 that a determination has been 
made that "measures not involving the use of force" have failed. 
In the same article, Doebbler (2011) goes on to say that a fact finding mission sent 
by the UN Human Rights Council and Security Council would have been important if 
one is to determine the need for the use of force yet this has not been the case. Moreover, 
the international community had not given the Libyan authorities a chance to comply with 
Resolution 1973 despite Libya announcing that it would respect the resolution: “in an 
unprecedented show of diplomatic intolerance, and without confirmation of the facts on 
the ground, Western leaders called the Libyan leader a liar”. In doing so, they laid the 
ground for the intervention, however was it really necessary to take up military action so 
quickly? Or were there underlying agendas in play?  
4.2.2 NATO versus Russia and China 
 
           When looking at the intervention in Libya, one can say that the country views were 
divided across two camps when it comes to the adoption of resolution 1973: those who 
are with the intervention and those against it. The main countries that were with the 
intervention are basically France, the UK, and the US supported by the UN secretary 
56 
 
general Ban Ki-moon whereas those that were against the intervention comprised of 
Russia and China.  
          Both Russia and China were against the intervention, continuously emphasizing 
the right of the Libyan state for sovereignty and the importance that other countries should 
place on that. If it were not for the Arab League supporting the intervention and asking 
for a no-fly zone, both Russia and China would have not been convinced of the 
importance of such and intervention. One must note however, that although the African 
regional organizations had asked for a no-fly zone, they had asked that it be limited in 
scope and that  it be removed immediately after there is no direct threat to Libyan 
civilians.  
              On the other hand, the countries that were with the intervention seemed not to 
care much about the sovereignty of Libya as a country. The countries had explicitly said 
that Qaddafi must go thus choosing sides in the intervention something that is against the 
Responsibility to protect doctrine.  Let us take the time in this section look at the interests 
those countries specifically France and the US who are with the intervention have in 
overthrowing Qaddafi. 
4.2.3 The US’s interest in Libya  
 
Prior to the conflict, the relationship between Libya and the US has been 
unpredictable and unreliable. Libya got its independence in 1951 supported by both the 
UN and the US. In 1954, the US established an Air Force Base in Libya – namely the 
Wheelus Air Force Base. When oil started to be extracted from Libya in 1959, the US 
established close economic ties with Libya so as to benefit from the oil. However, after 
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the coup-d’état that took place in 1969 led by Qaddafi, the relationship between the US 
and Libya worsened quickly: in 1970 the air base closed down and the relationship 
between Libya and the US oil companies became weak and the oil companies lost 
influence. The cooperation between Libya and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) as well as Qaddafi’s idea of Islamic socialism, his attempts to establish 
weapons of mass destruction and his support of international terrorism were the main 
factors in the weakening of the relationship with the US.  
The levels of the negative attitude between both countries kept varying until 2006 
where there were attempts to overthrow or kill Qaddafi by the US as well as classifying 
Qaddafi as the “mad dog of the Middle East”. Most of the resentment came from the 
attack on the Pan Am plane by terrorists supported through Libya. Furthermore 
Economic ties have been banned with Libya from 1986 to 1993. After accepting the 
responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and stopping its attempts to create weapons of 
mass destruction in 2003, the relationship between the US and Libya improved allowing 
for US Libyan relations to normalize in 2004.  
According to Hasler 2011, “ in 2011, on the eve of the Libyan uprising, the political 
relations between both countries had generally normalized, but tensions about human 
rights, democracy and the mutual behavior in the past still existed. Finally, the relations 
were ‘free of the formal constraints that once precluded cooperation,’ but ‘the 
relationship remains relatively undefined after decades of tensions’.” (p.58) 
Economic ties between Libya and the US were almost not existent due to 24 years 
of the embargo but the US was interested in the oil industry and the oil sector.  
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           Although after the massacre in Rwanda and the US policy to prevent another 
massacre to take place suggests that the US foreign policy and interference in Libya was 
to prevent the massacre from taking place and to ensure the protection of the civilians, 
there are other reasons that come into play for the US.   
           In May 2010, the National Security strategy for the US was issued highlighting the 
important role that the US foreign policy plays in terms of ensuring the safety and security 
of its American people, strengthening the US economy, and maintaining the US military 
authority. The strategy clearly pinpoints the following approaches:  
 
 The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and 
partners;  
  A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open 
international economic system that promotes opportunity and 
prosperity;  
 Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and  
 An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes 
peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to 
meet global challenges. (as cited in Hasler, 2012, p. 98)  
The US has placed itself in a position of the enhancer of the universal values 
which include those of human rights as well as a main player in international 
cooperation and overcomer of challenges when they arise. When it comes to the Libyan 
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case, Obama’s remarks said on March 28, 2011 and addressed to the Nation on Libya 
describes the US’s approach to the crises:  
American leadership is not simply a matter of going it alone and bearing all of 
the burden ourselves. Real leadership creates conditions and coalitions for 
others to step up as well, to work with allies and partners so that they bear their 
share of the burden and pay their share of the costs; and to see that the 
principles of justice and human dignity are upheld by all (as cited in Hasler, 
2012, p. 101) 
           The US has militarily taken part in several conflict in Muslim countries such as 
Iraq and Afghanistan and it needed an opportunity to prove itself as a defender of values 
such as democracy, freedom, humanity and dignity for every group and religion. The US 
needed to prove itself as a strong supporter to the Middle Eastern population without 
putting much risk on itself especially since much of the American population no longer 
favoured and supported military intervention. The fragility of the Libyan government 
provided that chance to the US and allowed it to intervene and “support” the people 
without significant military risk.  Furthermore, the economic interest in Libyan oil played 
a factor in that decision.  Therefore  according to Hasler (2012), “authors like Roberts, 
Slaughter and Kuperman, doubted the importance of  the idea of humanism for the US 
engagement in Libya, and demonstrated that US politics, motivated by the aim to create 
regime change ‘grossly exaggerated the humanitarian threat to justify military action in 
Libya’ ended up being right” (p. 110).   
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4.2.4 France’s interest in Libya 
 
Libya and France share a long history together especially that both France and Great 
Britain took over the mandate of Libya and colonized it after the Italians in 1943. Since 
independence and until Qaddafi took over the rule of Libya, the main relationship 
between France and Libya was based on arms deals this caused a burdening of the 
relations between France and Libya particularly since France was one of the countries 
who occupied the Suez Canal in 1956 and also was involved in aiding Israel in giving it 
arms both before and after the Israeli Arab war.  
On an economic level, France benefited a lot when Qaddafi came to power 
especially through the arms deals it made with Libya between 1970 and 1976 that 
enabled it to sign in 1974 an agreement guaranteeing that Libya will supply France with 
oil in exchange with technical and financial assistance. In 1977, Libya supported France 
in freeing some of its citizens in Chad however soon after the relationship weakened 
due to the policies that France held toward Middle Eastern countries and the role it 
played in the conflict in Chad which asked for Libya to withdraw from Chad in 1982. 
This led Libya to blame France for its defeat in Chad and became even worse when 
Libya was involved in the attack on the French passenger plane in 1989 killing 170 
people, 54 of which were French civilians. 
Upon the Libyan admittance of responsibility in the UTA plane bombing in 1999, 
the relationship between France and Libya improved. In 2003, the French president, 
Jacques Chirac flew to Libya to broker the compensation for the victims of the plane 
and thus removing obstacles that stood in the way  of positive political and economic 
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relations. The relationship reached its peak when Qaddafi flew to Paris in 2007 and 
signed over 10 billion dollar euro worth contracts in France. In 2009, the exports from 
France to Libya were over 1 billion dollars’ worth and the imports were around 3.1 
billion dollars’ worth making it the 3rd largest market for Libyan oil.  
Therefore, when looking at the bilateral relationship between the US and France and 
Libya before the uprising, one can say they were quite different. According to Hasler 
2012:  
The U.S., as a cold war superpower, had a historically tense relationship with 
Libya. Coined by a full spectrum of conflicts in the last decades, the political 
relationship between both states was—despite Qaddafis latest attempts to 
improve them—still very tense. Events of the past still had influence on the 
relationship with the Qaddafi regime before the uprising started. Economically, 
the relationship was insignificant, although U.S. companies hoped to benefit 
from a political detente.  
 While France and Libya had tensions that originate from the colonial past, was 
highly interested in the economic prospects that improved after Libya liberalized 
its economy. The need to support their domestic economy, especially after the 
financial crisis started in 2008/2009, encouraged all three governments to 
renew or improve relations with the Qaddafi regime, even if this would mean 
accepting Qaddafi as a negotiating partner. (p. 61) 
         At the time of the intervention in Libya, France’s main interests were based on 
domestic and geo-strategic considerations. On a domestic level, French President Sarkozy 
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was in need to strengthen his political position especially when it came to the regard of 
the right wing. In early 2011, Sarkozy was under huge political pressure especially when 
it came to the failure in the way the France handled the “Arab Spring”, the debatable links 
with the Tunisian regime before the revolution, the charges of corruption that the French 
Foreign Minister was accused of and which led to her dismissal as well as dissatisfaction 
that the people as a whole felt towards the government and its politics. Therefore, 
intervening in a former colony to help the people against an unpopular dictator was the 
perfect opportunity to seize especially that Qaddafi was not seen positively in the EU who 
viewed him as a threat in the sense of allowing the uncontrolled flow of immigrants to 
Europe.  This issue of illegal human trafficking to Europe through Libya was something 
that needed to be stopped and fast as it benefitted the right wing party and Sarkozy needed 
to have something in his favour.  
                Furthermore, the geo-strategic reason to regain power and credibility when it 
comes to North Africa and the Muslim world was also one of the main factors that 
contributed to the decision to intervene.  From that perspective, based on the official 
papers and statements from French policy makers, it seems like the main reason or aim 
that the intervention was trying to achieve was to spread human rights and the idea of 
humanism in Libya.  
             Another motive that France has in the intervention is to regain its political 
influence in the region. France was a colonial power of North Africa up until 1962 
colonizing countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya. France has kept close 
relations with some of its colonies after independence and plays a role in influencing their 
domestic and foreign policy; this is seen in Algeria and the Ivory Coast for example where 
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France supports Algeria in its military regime and has intervened several times in the 
Ivory Coast’s political affairs.  
              Finally the economy plays another vital role in the interest of France in North 
Africa as it would like to participate in the economic growth and development of France’s 
economic interests in the continent. 
4.3 The strategic position of Libya and oil  
 
The conflict in Libya while being one in which the Libyan people are leading 
the uprising, had the backing of the international community where the UN Security 
Council issued resolution 1973 allowing a no-fly zone and military interference in the 
conflict, less than a month after it started. Etzioni (2012) questioned the military 
interference which had its main argument according to the international community be 
as one that was strictly humanitarian and was done in order to prevent Qaddafi from his 
threat against the rebels. Yet this was not the only goal. According to Etizioni (2012) 
the goal of the Libyan mission expanded to include a change in regime which was seen 
as essential to achieve the humanitarian goal as well as to fulfill the imperial project in 
both North and West Africa. To understand this concept better we must therefore look 
at the strategic position that Libya plays in this project.  Libya occupies a strategic 
position since it is located on the North African coast that is very important to defend 
European borders from African immigration. 
 Furthermore, Libya is the seventeenth largest world oil producer and the third 
largest in Africa. It also has the largest oil reserves in Africa (and significant natural gas 
reserves). It is important to note that the rebellion originated in eastern Libya which is 
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also the center of oil production and refining. Libyan oil holds an important position in 
the world especially for the US. Prior to Qaddafi’s rule, the American oil industry 
thrived because of the Libyan industry. After the reforms in the early 2000s and the 
mutual political agreement between the US and Libya, the US was able to increase its 
share in the Libyan oil production. There have been further planned projects to solidify 
this even more leading Libya to become a promising economic partner for the US.  
Therefor the US has a huge interest in Libyan oil and wanted to both maintain the 
already established contracts as well as stabilize Libyan oil production. The Libyan 
conflict harmed this US interest especially if it were to continue longer without 
significant production of oil.  Removing Libyan oil production from the market would 
prove to be damaging for the world economy in general and the US economy in 
particular.   
Bush et al (2011) state that the “opposition in Benghazi offered Washington the 
opportunity for regime change. It offered an opportunity to install a Tripoli government 
that will be predictable, will accept neoliberal reform, the opening of Libya’s oil and 
gas sector and a military platform in a geo-strategically crucial part of Africa” (p.360).   
Summary of France and US’s interests in Libya 
The United States interest in Libya France’s interest in Libya:  
 From an economic level: 
o The US is one of the primary 
importers of Libyan oil 
 From a foreign policy level:   
o The May 2010 US National 
Security strategy for the US 
highlights the important role that 
the US foreign policy plays in 
terms of ensuring the safety and 
security of its American people, 
strengthening the US economy, 
and maintaining the US military 
authority  
 From an economic level:  
o France is also one of the primary 
importers of Libyan oil 
o France had benefitted economically 
when Libya liberalized its economy 
and was hoping to benefit again after 
the 2008/2009 financial crisis 
 From a domestic level:  
o Sarkozy was under scrutiny for how 
he handled the Arab Spring especially 
in Tunisia, he also had charges of 
corruption and therefore intervening 
in a former colony to help the people 
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o Militarily the US needed to prove 
itself as a defender of values such 
as democracy, freedom, humanity 
and dignity for every group and 
religion 
against an unpopular dictator was the 
perfect opportunity to seize 
o Libya has been accused of aiding in 
illegal human trafficking to Europe. 
Taking down Qaddafi would be a 
positive note to the right wing  
 From a geo strategic level:  
o Need for France to regain power and 
credibility when it comes to North 
Africa and the Muslim world 
 From a foreign policy level:  
o France wanted to regain its political 
influence in the region after having 
been a colonial power in North Africa 
in the past.  
 
4.4 The Role of Mediation 
 
Pursuant to Resolution 1970, and as part of the International Community’s 
approach to putting an end to the conflict; the United Nations appointed former 
Jordanian Foreign Minister Abdul Elah al-Khatib on March 6, 2011 as special envoy to 
Libya for humanitarian and political talks due to the increased intensity of the fighting 
with Mr. Qaddafi launching air, land and sea attacks against his opponents.   This 
mediation is greatly needed in order to ensure humanitarian assistance to millions of 
people in the county. According to Balogh et al (2011),  for a mediation to be effective,  
six dimensions must be available: 1- approval of the mediator by all parties, 2- the 
ability of the mediator to positively influence the context of a conflict situation and 
transform the perception of it, 3- communication and being able to bring about 
interaction between the conflicting parties, 4-constructive interpretation of facts or 
showing flexibility in the understanding of the specific situation; 5- timing of the 
mediation, 6- the extent to which the mediator can influence the conflicting parties. 
Unfortunately, according to the Finnish Institute of Foreign Affairs, the UN prospects 
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for mediation have become more complicated after the security resolution 1970 
authorizing the international criminal court to investigate criminal actions by the Libyan 
leadership who do not approve of the UN as a mediator.  On May 3, 2011, the secretary-
general’s special envoy for Libya, Abdel- Elah Al-Khatib, briefed the Security Council 
on his meditation efforts saying that although both the Libyan authorities and the rebels 
were “ready and willing” to implement a cease-fire, they disagreed on the terms. The 
Libyan government said that a cease-fire must be accompanied by a halt to the NATO 
bombings, while the TNC would not agree to a cease-fire would it were not directly 
linked to the departure of Qaddafi. Turkey, Russia and the African Union also took 
upon the role of mediator in the Libyan conflict yet again to no avail.   
According to Balogh et al (2011), in the case of Turkey, 
 there was a significant problem with approval. Libyan opposition did not want 
Ankara to mediate in the conflict and by the time Turkey engaged in mediatory 
efforts, opposition forces had already decided to topple the regime. Thus, there 
was a lack of common ground between the parties, suggesting also a problem 
with timing. Turkish mediation initiatives in Libya were hindered by the fact 
that at least one of the parties was not ready to negotiate. Timing and the 
opposing parties’ perceptions were not ripe for mediation (p.3)  
 
On April 10, 2011, the African Union sent its mediators to negotiate a ceasefire 
between the conflicting parties. The mediators included officials from South Africa, 
Mauritania, Mali and Congo.  They were to meet with both representatives from 
Qaddafi and from the opposition.  Despite the fact that Qaddafi agreed to the road map 
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set out by the African Union, the rebels flatly rejected that treaty. Therefore, the African 
Union’s attempt to mediate the conflict was also one that failed.  Although the African 
Union met with the rebel group, the group felt that the 53 nation union was in the 
pocket of Qaddafi and was supporting him especially since it was well known that the 
Qaddafi had given an enormous amount of donations to the AU. Furthermore, the 
African Union’s Democracy Charter is clear stating that those who take power by force 
are not welcomed and the opposition movement was doing just that. The lack of trust 
and acceptance that the rebels felt towards the AU resulted in its failure to broker an 
agreement.  
On May 26, 2011, at a G8 summit, Russia announced its willingness to negotiate 
an agreement in Libya and to facilitate Qaddafi’s departure. However, similar to all the 
other mediation efforts at the time, Russia’s effort to mediate the conflict in Libya was 
also condemned to failure. This is mainly due to the fact that Russia had a shaky 
relationship with the Transitional National Council, the rebel movement opposing 
Qaddafi at the time. Russia refused to recognize the Transitional National Council as a 
legitimate representative of the Libyan people and thus approval of Russia as a mediator 
from the perspective of the TNC was limited and so was communication. Furthermore, 
Russia’s interests lay within the keeping of Qaddafi in power which did not give it an 
advantage to transform or constructively influence the conflict.  
4.5 Restoring Libya’s Authority post-Qaddafi 
 
           The international community according to R2P, does not only have a 
responsibility to prevent and react but it also has a huge responsibility to rebuild since 
protection and human security does not only come from an absence of war but also 
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from the ability of the country to provide its people with a decent living.    Furthermore, 
as previously mentioned, the report on Preventing Deadly Conflict states that to 
adequately resolve a conflict it is not enough to just stop the violence, rather one needs 
to address the root causes of the conflict and rebuild societies that have been shattered 
by war According to a report published by New York University’s Center on 
International Cooperation (2012), post Qaddafi, the Security Council mandated the 
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to work with the NTC to 
rebuilding Libya. UNSMIL has played a central role in post-conflict work in Libya and 
in coordinating other international actors to work on facing the following challenges:  
 Addressing human rights concerns: There have been many reports on human 
rights abuses by the Qaddafi troops and thus a UN inter-agency humanitarian 
assessment team was sent to Tripoli in September 2011; the UN Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) put a team of senior officials in 
the field where the Commission released a widely-read report on 2 March 2012 
summarizing its findings.  
 Taking up transitional justice issues through the International Criminal Court 
particularly when it comes to Saif Al Isalm Qaddafi and Abdullah Senussi, 
Muammar Qaddafi’s former intelligence chief  
 Creating conditions for economic recovery. There have been multiple tracks to 
assist Libya to economic recovery.  The UN Security Council lifted its sanctions 
on Libya freeing up needed assets for the NTC. Libya also looked to strengthen 
bilateral ties with neighbors, and Gulf countries like Qatar and the UAE. The 
NTC, European Union, United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary 
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Fund (IMF) and other international partners jointly agreed on a framework for a 
post-conflict needs assessment in September 2011, creating a basis for important 
political-financial linkages for post-conflict assistance. 
• Building an inclusive political framework. The interim government is committed 
to political reform, including national elections that took place in early July, 2012. 
However the continued activity of Libya’s militias remain a concern for Libya at this 
point.  
Upon looking at the Libyan revolution and how it unfolded, we can say that it seems 
to be mainly following a Western Model – something that is in the interest of the West 
since they have often been threatened by the Qaddafi regime. By the time the revolution 
began, the political system had not collapsed yet it was terrible weaker than what it used 
to be. Qaddafi’s socialist ideology, held in high regard in the past, is no longer 
something that the young people of Libya believe in especially since most of the riches 
of Libya were being exploited by Qaddafi’s family who spent the revenues from 
Libya’s oil resources in the West. Furthermore, the Libyan Army is not as strong as it 
used to be since Qaddafi undermined it over the years in fear that it may overthrow him 
at one point in time. Most of the committees that had been established like the popular 
committee, the revolutionary committee and the General People’s congress were also 
undermined and had lost their credibility since they have been widely corrupted.    
Therefore, it is quite obvious that at the start of the Arab Spring, the young and 
educated people of Libya have become major political players. These people have a 
different worldview and values than the regime as they are more accustomed to the 
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modern life and the use of the internet, mobile phones, social media and networks. They 
are accustomed to the life presented by the West and hold that ideology. Therefore just 
like anywhere in the world, especially the Arab World, a generational conflict arose 
where the young people have overcome their fear of the older generation and aspires for 
change in their nation: a change in which they can portray their positive, global and 
open perspective to the world. Therefore three other new groups have entered Libyan 
internal politics and have to be greatly taken into consideration in the restoration of the 
country:  
 The first group that is to be taken into consideration is the Islamists, who have 
always been marginalized by Qaddafi as he continuously feared that they may 
overthrow his regime as they had already tried multiple of times.  Some Islamist 
groups are more moderate and are linked to Tunisia’s Islamists and Egypt’s 
Muslim brotherhood, while others are more radical and have roots in al-Qaeda 
and/or the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia. 
 The second group is made of the Arab tribes who were often attacked and 
undermined by Qaddafi’s administration and thus are part of the political arena 
with revenge in mind.   
 The third group that have played an active role in the revolution itself are the 
Berbers. The Berbers fought actively against Qaddafi and constitute between 5 
to 10% of the population.  
All these groups will clearly play a role in the shaping of the future of Libya and 
will all want to portray their own image in the “new” Libya that has arisen after the 
revolution. In the years to come their main challenge will be in the holding of free 
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elections and writing a constitution that is representative of Libyan society as well as 
introduce reforms in all sectors mainly the economy.  They need to find a way to create 
viable political parties and programs where everyone’s vote is heard whether it is the 
tribal leader, the educated youth, the Islamist or the moderate and those living in the 
urban cities or those in the more rural parts of the country.  
This process of rebuilding Libya will take time and will need to be approached in a 
way that would ensure the best for the country and its people.  
It is still early to be able to determine the consequences of the uprising in Libya. 
The intervention did lead to the death of Qaddafi and the change in regime however 
there is much to be done in terms of building a Libyan society that is able to stand on its 
feet.  Anderson (2011) states that “Libya will need to begin by constructing the 
rudiments of a civil society... It will need to redefine the relationship between their 
privileged capital cities and their sullen hinterlands. Therefore … Libya confronts the 
complexity not of democratization but of state formation. It will need to construct a 
coherent national identity and public administration out of Qaddafi’s shambles” (p.7). 
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Chapter Five 
The Role of Regional Powers, Lessons Learnt and 
Recommendations 
 
 This chapter will project based on the school of realism a conclusion on what 
happened in Libya. The hypothesis that the intervention is pure humanitarian is to be 
tested. Furthermore, what are the new waves or syndrome of the Uprising and what is 
the role of other regional powers in the region, which Turkey may be one of these 
emerging major powers.   
“Everything that is not new in a time of innovation is pernicious.”- Louis 
Antoine de Saint-Just.  
“The impact of revolutionary developments is hard to predict.” Thus, is the case 
of the Arab Uprising or what is called the “Arab Malaise” which can be described with 
what Mahmoud Darwish’s : “Singing in a cage is possible and so is Happiness.” The 
simple slogan that emerges in the uprising is mainly: “Down with the president. Long 
Live the Future. May it be so!”  
The paper has taken into consideration the international intervention in Libya. 
The main causes and effects and their ramifications. For instance, as Samuel Huntington 
puts it in his classic book Political Order in Changing Societies, “A revolution is a 
rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a 
society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government 
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activities and policies.” (Huntington, S.) In addition, Huntington continues, “A 
complete revolution, however, also involves a second phase: the creation and 
institutionalization of a new political order.” 
Despite the different strategies adopted by the UN and international community 
to stop the conflict in Libya and to ensure a quick and easy transition to a post Qaddafi 
era, it was after all the use of force that led to the ending of the conflict or rather to the 
displacing of Qaddafi. In the process, however, over thousands of civilians died 
(estimates are between 2,500 and 25,000) with 72 killed during NATO air strikes as 
reported by Human Rights Watch. However was the use of force the only solution to the 
conflict in Libya or could the international community have intervened in other ways 
that could have resulted in less civilian casualties and divide in the country?  
As this thesis attempts to show, if one is to look closely at how the international 
community had dealt with the conflict in Libya as opposed to the conflicts in other Arab 
countries such as Syria for example it is interesting to note that no use of force was 
called for in those conflicts. However in the Libyan case, less than a month on the start 
of the conflict, the use of force had been authorized. Bush et al (2011) question the 
resolution, by stating that “R2P was used in the Libyan case as a pre-emptive rationale 
for intervention to prevent greater loss of civilian life after some had died in state 
violence, while in Syria thousands of civilians have actually been slain by security 
forces and repression in Yemen, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia has reinforced state power 
against demonstrators calling for political reform” (p. 358).  This may be explained by 
the interest that the Western countries had in Libya especially the inability to control 
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Qaddafi. From the onset of Qaddafi’s rule, Libya had been seen as the “rogue state” 
defined by Chomsky as a state that poses a threat to its neighbors and the entire world.  
According to Kinsman (2011) the authorization of force by the United Nations Security 
Council in such proportion has been unprecedented in 66 years of its existence and thus 
the Libyan experience went beyond the protection of civilians.   
Etzioni (2012) also questioned the military interference which originated 
according to the international community as a strictly humanitarian intervention to 
prevent Qaddafi from his threat against the rebels. However, the goal quickly changed. 
According to Etizioni (2012) the goal of the Libyan mission expanded to include a 
change in regime which is seen as essential to achieve the humanitarian goal. It is 
therefore important to look at the imperial project in both North and West Africa and 
understand the strategic position that Libya plays in this project.  The first thing to look 
at is Libya’s strategic position since it occupies an important geo-strategic location on 
the North Africa coast, seen increasingly by the EU as crucial in its strategy to maintain 
‘fortress Europe’ in the defense of borders from African immigration. Another factor to 
look at is understandably an economic factor based on oil and energy demands which is 
an important dimension to address. Libya is the seventeenth largest world oil producer 
and the third largest in Africa. It is likely to also have the largest oil reserves on the 
continent (and significant natural gas reserves) and its crude oil is of high quality low 
sulphur content with 85% of production exported to Europe, and 5% to the US. It is 
important to note that the rebellion originated in eastern Libya which is also the center 
of oil production and refining.  Bush et al (2011) believe that “opposition in Benghazi 
offered Washington the opportunity for regime change. It offered an opportunity to 
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install a Tripoli government that will be predictable, will accept neoliberal reform, the 
opening of Libya’s oil and gas sector and a military platform in a geo-strategically 
crucial part of Africa” (p.360).  On the same note, looking at the Libya December 2012 
Country report issued by the Economics Intelligent Unit, Libya’s Fiscal Policy allocated 
54.8 billion dollars to be invested in the development of the oil sector in Libya. The oil 
was mainly exported to Italy importing 21.5%; Germany importing 13.5%, and France 
importing 13.4%, thus totaling around 48% of the total Libyan oil exports.  
Therefore if one is to analyze all the different factors that come into play, the use 
of force therefore becomes a matter of international interests rather than a matter to aid 
the Libyan people or that of humanitarian intervention. In solving the Libyan conflict, 
the use of force and military intervention could have come at a later stage while the use 
of negotiation and mediation could have been emphasized and encouraged further.  
According to Etzioni 2012, as early as May 2011, Qaddafi offered a ceasefire to the 
rebels that would have ended the conflict yet with no regime changed however the 
rebels refused it. In his article ‘NATO’s Intervention in Libya: A New Model’, 
Westervelt (2011) argues that although NATO stated that throughout the conflict, its 
actions were limited to supporting the U.N. resolution that calls for protecting civilians 
and enforcing an arms embargo, it certainly pushed the boundaries, providing close air 
support for anti-Qaddafi rebels. To most observers, NATO was clearly taking the rebel 
side in a civil war and backing efforts to oust Qaddafi. Had NATO not been supporting 
the rebels at the time, and demanding a change of regime, both Qaddafi and the rebels 
would have been forced to give negotiation and mediation a serious chance. However, 
being backed up by the international community, the rebels did not see a need to 
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negotiate. As Dunne and Giftikins (2011)  point out, “the no-fly zone and other punitive 
sanctions were in place for five months before the Qaddafi regime fell. It is too soon for 
a final reckoning of the intervention; however, it is clear that the UN mandated 
measures curbed Libyan state terror and tipped the balance of forces in favor of the 
Transitional National Council. Yet the specter of Kosovo remains in terms of a 
mismatch between the protection of civilians mandate and the declared aim ‘of the 
intervening states’ to remove Qaddafi from power” (p. 525).  
5.1 The Political Rationale of the US and France 
 
Looking at what is currently happening in Syria in terms of mass atrocities, 
violation of human rights and the Syrian regime fighting with its own people one can 
but question the influence of norms when it comes to humanitarian intervention and the 
Responsibility to Protect. The cases of both Syria and Libya are very similar and the 
rhetoric of Western countries against what was happening in Libya and what is 
happening in Syria is almost identical. When it comes to statements made about Libya, 
US President Obama said that “… the violence must stop: Muammar Qaddafi has lost 
the legitimacy and he must leave…” Similarly the comments in the case of Syria were 
“I strongly condemn this brutality, including the disgraceful attacks on Syrian civilians 
in cities like Hama and Deir al Zour… for the sake of the Syrian people, the time has 
come for President Assad to step aside.” (as cited in Hasler, 2012, p. 147). France has 
also made the same remarks on both conflicts however the applications are not enforced 
the same way. Therefore one can conclude that Syria and Libya have been treated as 
two different cases although extremely similar and both fit in the criteria to have a 
humanitarian intervention and thus implement the Responsibility to Protect. So what is 
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different?  The difference according to Hasler (2012) mainly lies in 2 things: the time of 
occurrence and the country’s position in world politics, economics, society, and 
military.  
When looking at the time of the uprising, we can see that the Syrian uprising 
started on March 15, 2011 and the reaction of the security forces came on the 18th of 
March, 2011.  This means that the uprising in Syria happened 4 months after the start of 
the uprising in Tunisia which spilled over to Egypt and Libya. The military intervention 
in Libya happened one day before the Syrian crisis which led the whole focus to mainly 
be on Libya especially since the media, politicians and the global community were all 
focused on what is happening with the military intervention. Another point worth 
mentioning when looking at the timeline basically has to do with Russia and China who 
both were not supporters of the military intervention. The Russian government, and 
upon assessing the intervention, believed that the NATO campaign “in many cases go 
beyond the framework set by the Security Council” and that the use of “excessive 
military force would lead to further additional casualties among civilians” reaching the 
conclusion that Russia will “never allow the Security Council to authorize anything 
similar to what happened in Libya” (as cited in Hasler, 2012, p. 150). Without Russia’s 
acceptance of a military intervention in Syria, the US will not be able to intervene in the 
conflict. Moreover, learning from the Libyan crises, countries have become less excited 
about having a military intervention as they are unsure that the intervention has led to a 
state of peace in Libya or a democracy for that matter especially since ongoing domestic 
conflicts are taking place.  
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In comparison to Libya, Syria is stronger in terms of social structure, geography, 
strength, size, and leadership and military and is politically supported by countries like 
Iran and allies like Hezbollah and Hamas and therefore, holding a military intervention 
will lead to high stakes and a huge resistance.  Although both countries are comparable 
in terms of human rights violations and violence against the people, the politics 
involved in intervening in Syria provides much higher stakes to countries which shows 
that any intervention cannot be based on humanitarian considerations alone. 
Both the US and France condemned the leadership and the violence in Libya 
and Syria, especially that the actions have been taken against the population itself. The 
countries officially support and advocate for human rights, democracy and justice as the 
main foundations for a modern democracy. These concepts and ideas definitely played a 
role in the intervention that happened in Libya but as has been analyzed in this thesis, it 
hasn’t played the major role in the Libyan case and definitely not at all in the Syrian 
case. Both the US and France follow their own national interests and use the concepts as 
a means to establish norms or an umbrella to justify their interests.  Although partly 
believing in the idea of the defending of human rights and democracy, the idea of 
realism, or domestic politics dictate the decisions that these countries take.   
When it came to Libya, the US initially did not want to take part of the Libyan 
conflict and instead allowed NATO to take charge of and responsibility for the 
intervention. However, upon further evaluation of the crisis and finding that an 
intervention may serve the US’s interest in gainer trust and sympathy from the new 
movements in the Middle East, the US used the idea of humanity as a main driver for 
military engagement of course realizing that the Libyan regime had become weak and 
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thus could not be of much danger.  The same could be said of France who did a similar 
assessment to the situation based on internal domestic politics. President Sarkozy at the 
time wanted to try and gain political support for his election campaign through the 
ousting of Qaddafi and regaining influence in North Africa.  Although not bringing 
about the result it hoped for, the case of Libya was a calculated risk for the French 
government. 
On the other hand, the case of Syria is very different. After seeing the outcome 
of the intervention in Libya and finding out that it doesn’t have much impact on 
domestic politics, both the US and France are not as likely to want to venture off into an 
intervention that has little if any pay-off for them on a domestic level. Furthermore, the 
assessed impact of the Libyan intervention did not bring about the  positive image that 
the US had hoped for in the MENA region nor did it bring about a boom in the 
economic sector, and the likelihood of that happening if an intervention takes place in 
Syria, is quite small. Finally, the risk of holding an intervention in Syria is much higher 
and more difficult than in Libya as it can lead to a civil war and a regional conflict 
something that is likely to affect negatively the US- Israeli and US-Iranian relations. 
The high military risk is not in the interest of France as well as it will not gain any 
strategic advantage in the region.  
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5.2 Concluding Remarks 
 
 This thesis has served to show not only that there is selectivity in intervention, 
but also that this selectivity arises based on the interests of the countries that comprise 
the permanent members of the Security Council. According to Fermor (2013), looking 
at “rhetorical inconsistency, we may draw the conclusion that where economic, 
geographic, military and diplomatic difficulties outweigh likely economic and strategic 
advantages Britain, France and the US (the three NATO members with permanent seats 
on the UN Security Council) are unlikely to press for or undertake military intervention. 
(p. 349)”. In his same article,  NATO’s decision to intervene in Libya (2011): Realist 
principles or humanitarian norms?,   Fermor goes on to quote Roberts and Zaum 
(2008) by saying that “The Council‟s selectivity is rooted in the Charter as well as in 
the political realities within which the Council operates” adding that “The Council is 
not intended to maintain the rule of law: it was intended to maintain international peace 
and security [...] Selectivity is an inherent, and prudent, aspect of this role”(p.349).  
International humanitarian law, and the Responsibility to Protect, allows nations to pick 
and choose when and how to intervene based on their own understanding of 
international normativity. Thus, when a country (namely members of the Security 
Council) sees that it is in its own best interest to actually intervene, it would push for an 
intervention to take place and when a country does not see it in its best interest to 
intervene, it would stay away bringing about double standards to the concept of 
humanitarian intervention and R2P.  It is therefore fitting to look at things from an 
international political reality as Morgenthau put it:  
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"The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power 
among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the 
statesman‟s thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and 
legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil" (as cited in Fermor, 2013 p. 
350) 
 
This however does not rule out the importance of humanitarian concern, nor 
does it mean that realists do not do things out of a humanitarian purpose yet it means 
that it is important to distinguish between what is desirable and what is possible. It is 
desirable, for example, that the conflict in Syria ends, however at this point it is not 
possible to do so without harming other interests and other nations and causing conflict 
within them as well.   
The status of dignity project failed in Libya based on the interference in 
sovereignty. In 1970, Henry Kissinger said “Control Oil and you will control nations. 
Control food and you will control people.” Thus, the main drive behind the intervention 
in Libya is to control oil and the nation. The strength of Qaddafi’s regime is its 
geographical location – located in the center of the African nations yet reflecting a sign 
of independence between them. The main interest for the countries of the West lies in 
destroying Qaddafi’s vision on the Unity of the Arabs and the African world. Qaddafi 
represented a revolutionary leader who pressures all the major political powers to defeat 
him and turn him down from power. Qaddafi’s political regime presented a challenge to 
the west on the economic level.  
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All investments that were taking place in Libya were controlled by the Libyan 
government. This is mainly due to the fact that the central bank was state owned and all 
the investments were carried out through the “Libyan Investment Authority” (LIA), 
which managed a huge portfolio of investments which the West did not have a share in. 
These investments were mainly generated by the oil revenues. Qaddafi’s vision of a pan 
Arab or African Union was based primarily on the vision to invest those huge monetary 
resources and get rid of the western aid.  According to him, it is this aid that deprived 
the Arab and African countries of their independence and turned them to slaves toward 
the major donors. One major threat that was present in Qaddafi’s vision is that of “The 
Gold Standard”.  Qaddafi dreamt of eliminating the US dollar currency and instead 
exchanging it with a new currency that would be used in multiple Arab and African 
countries. His vision was to introduce the gold dinars into the African and Muslims 
countries and build the exchange currency on that balance. Qaddafi believed that “by 
establishing and supporting this currency a real monetary wealth will be generated, free 
from predatory lending agencies and depreciating fiat currencies.” 
 By examining all the facts that were stated we can bring to the table several 
variables that are involved into the equation. We have a visionary leader dreaming of 
unity between the Arab and African countries, a wealthy nation, huge resources, 
geographically challenging location and most importantly a “mad” leader that believes 
in defeating nations of the West. In his main discord and vision the Qaddafi regime 
challenged the main hypothesis of the school of realism which is  the “ Security 
Dilemma” defined  by Waltz as “ the situation that emerges when a state or coalition of 
states grows in power, thus , making another state or coalition feel threaten , leading it 
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to seek ways to check the other” (p.32). This new balance of power that Qaddafi tried to 
create in his vision by challenging the existing system played a major role in the 
intervention in Libya. Qaddafi’s regime dared to change the rule of Global security by 
all means. Although the ways for interventions were legalized within the UN resolution 
and implemented by the NATO forces, the waves of democracy didn’t reach Libyan 
territory. In fact the major oil and investments companies reached the Libyan coast and 
landed safely in a blessed sea to shrink the Libyan sovereignty.         
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